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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities arbitration' is now ascendant as a favored device for
resolving disputes between broker-dealers and their customers, and
much of this recent status derives from a series of United States Su-
preme Court decisions.' Culminating in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon3 and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., these decisions have ended the reign of certain restrictive
judicial decisions that previously governed the availability of arbitra-
tion under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Arbitration Act) .5 Ac-
cordingly, such developments presage a greatly expanded use of
arbitration as a future means of resolving disputes between broker-deal-
ers and customers." Indeed, since the Supreme Court placed its impri-
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the scope of this Article shall be confined to securities arbitra-
tion based on disputes between small investors-who shall also be referred to as "customers," or
"public customers"-and the broker-dealers, also referred to as "brokers" or "firms," whom those
investors engage to effect transactions in the securities markets. See Chipello, Streets Skid May
Lure Brokers to Take Some for a Ride, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1989, at C1, col. 3 (describing a
customer-broker dispute that led to arbitration). "Few financial relationships are as fraught with
potential conflict as that between stockbroker and investor. After all, the broker's livelihood de-
pends on generating trading commissions, not automatically on enhancing the investor's returns."
Id.
2. See, e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
3. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
4. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
6. The prediction that securities arbitration will be employed increasingly gains additional
credibility and support when these cases are viewed against the backdrop of certain current eco-
nomic phenomena. See, e.g., Arbitration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommu-
nications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 265
(1988) [hereinafter Arbitration Reform Hearings] (statement of James C. Meyer, Pres., N. Am.
1200
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matur on the arbitration process, the arbitral forum already has become
the likely, and in some instances the mandated,7 situs of deliberative
proceedings on such conflicts." Logically, the focus of the debate and
inquiry on the general subject of brokerage agreement dispute resolu-
tion must turn to the nature of this specific process.9
Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n). "Use of securities arbitration increased dramatically in 1987 as a result of two
key events: the U.S. Supreme Court's June 8, 1987 decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon ("Shearson"), which upheld the enforceability of mandatory predispute arbitration
agreements, and the stock market crash of October." Id. at 266. The effect of the crash subsided in
time, but the case law remains. At the same time, however, the parade of events giving rise to
increasing numbers of customer-broker disputes, and thus to arbitration cases, continues. See, e.g.,
Wall Street's Recession Goes On, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1989, at H3, col. 1 (discussing the recession
in the securities industry because of lack of investor confidence due to market shocks, as well as
other factors); Tough Times on Wall Street Dictate Still More Layoffs, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1989,
at C1, col. 3. A major concern in such an environment is that the layoffs, cuts in commissions, and
other effects of this recession will place pressure on sales departments of brokerage firms, with a
correspondingly adverse effect on the ethical behavior of brokers in their treatment of customers.
See, e.g., Chipello, supra note 1, at C1, col. 3 (stating that "now with Wall Street in a bad slump,
investor advocates worry that the temptation for brokers to take advantage of the situation may be
greater than ever"); Jasen, What Investors Don't Know Can Boomerang on Them, Wall, St. J.,
Oct. 24, 1989, at C1, col. 3, C14, col. 6 (claiming that broker did not fully inform investor of the
various risks associated with zero-coupon certificates of deposit that eventually turned sour, and
stating that "[y]ou always have to watch out for yourself [because] [n]o one else will watch out for
you"). The latter article discusses an arbitration dispute in which a broker allegedly induced a 100-
year-old widow with failing eyesight to liquidate her savings accounts, place them in a brokerage
account, and sign a margin, or leveraged, trading agreement. The complaint asserted that the bro-
ker made unauthorized and excessive trades, resulting in a sizeable margin call, or deficit, in the
trading account. Id. at Cl, col. 4.
7. The reference is to the controversial mandatory predispute arbitration provisions that are
placed in some brokerage contracts. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114
(1st Cir. 1989) (affirming a lower court decision overturning, as violative of the supremacy clause, a
Massachusetts regulation purporting to prohibit inclusion of mandatory predispute arbitration
provisions); see also Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 476 (statement of David S.
Ruder, Securities and Exchange Comm'n (SEC) Chairman) (discussing the securities arbitration
process and the voluntariness of agreements to arbitrate disputes between broker-dealers and
investors).
8. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at Executive Summary (statement of
David S. Ruder, SEC Chairman). "The Supreme Court's decision in [McMahon] ...as well as a
greater interest by . . .customers in using arbitration, have increased the likelihood that most
federal securities law disputes between brokers and their customers will be resolved through arbi-
tration." Id.; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 243 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that the "Court [in its majority opinion] thus approves the abandonment of the
judiciary's role in the resolution of claims under the Exchange Act and ledves such claims to the
arbitral forum"); Masucci & Morris, Arbitration at the National Association of Securities Dealers
and the New York Stock Exchange, in 650 P.L.I., SECURITIEs ARBITRATION 1989 at 437, 442-44
(corporate law and practice course handbook series for 1989) [hereinafter SECURITIES ARBITRATION
1989]. Between 1980 and 1988, the number of cases received at industry sponsored forums operat-
ing under the Uniform Code of Arbitration grew from 830 to 6101. Id. at 442. Reasons for the large
increase include favorable case law, market events, growth and increased complexity within the
financial markets, and increased awareness of and emphasis on securities arbitration. Id. at 443.
9. See, e.g., Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 170-77 (statement of Professor
Norman S. Poser) (noting that in view of the McMahon decision, the fairness of arbitration proce-
dures has become a matter of immediate concern); Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMa-
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Given the prominence that securities arbitration is likely to enjoy
in the future, probing questions must be asked now regarding the effec-
tiveness, basic fairness, and even legality of the procedures that effectu-
ate it. Underscoring the importance of such inquiry are certain basic
facts about securities arbitration in America today. First, this dispute
resolution process is most often administered by organizations affiliated
with, and indeed part of, the securities industry; and second, the pro-
cess is predictably preferred by that industry to traditional litigation.10
Unquestionably, then, the inquiry must begin by addressing the cir-
cumstances under which a customer elects or agrees to have disputes
resolved through arbitration, and continue through the hearing, final
award, and any subsequent judicial challenges. The following questions
also should be posed in the interest of assuring both integrity and effec-
hon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 361 (1987-1988). Professor Constantine Katsoris has stated:
Since McMahon, there has been a flurry of activity in, and focus upon, the general area of
arbitration of public securities disputes. This activity has generated particular interest in such
subjects as: arbitration forums; pretrial procedures and discovery; remedies and relief; compo-
sition of panels; training, background and evaluation of arbitrators; and the rendering of writ-
ten opinions.
Id.; see also Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 461 (statement of Rep. Edward J.
Markey, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance) (reporting on the in-
troduction in the House of the Securities Arbitration Reform Act of 1988, H.R. 4960, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess.). H.R. 4960 was introduced on June 30, 1988, by Representative Rick Boucher. Id. at 463
(text of H.R. 4960). Representative Boucher introduced the Bill on behalf of "himself, Mr. Mar-
key, and Mr. Dingell." Id. Both its introduction and its substance show that the debate surround-
ing securities brokerage disputes now focuses on the nature of the arbitration process. As
Chairman Edward Markey explained at the hearing:
IT]he bill contains three basic consumer protections. . . one, it makes it unlawful for a bro-
ker/dealer to refuse to do business with a customer on the basis of the customer's refusal to
sign a pre-dispute arbitration clause; (2) it requires that the arbitration agreement be on a
separate page and that it prominently disclose the consequences of signing such a contract,
and (3) it provides for fair arbitration procedures for those customers who elect arbitration as
the forum for resolution of their disputes.
Id. at 461 (statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey). Chairman Markey indicated that because "the
SEC and its staff have apparently suffered a failure of nerve, after receiving a fire storm of criti-
cism [regarding proposed areas of improvement in the arbitration process] from industry lobbyists
... the possibility of legislation . . . becom[ing] a reality" was necessary to force action by the
SEC and the securities industry. Id.
10. See supra note 9. Underlying Chairman Markey's expressions of concern that the SEC
was not fulfilling its duty to improve the arbitration system is the assumption that not only did the
securities industry favor arbitration over court litigation, but also that the industry favored it just
as it existed. See Quinn, How to Fight Your Broker, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1988, at 43 (strongly
implying that the courts and the SEC have given in to the industry and that arbitration is basi-
cally a proindustry device for limiting a customer's rights under the guise of fair dispute
resolution).
What can you do about unscrupulous brokers? Less than you used to, thanks to a recent
proindustry decision by the Supreme Court [McMahon]. If you signed an agreement with
your brokerage house requiring that disputes be settled by arbitration (as most margin cus-
tomers do), you may be stuck with it.
Id.
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tiveness in the resolution of conflicts through this important vehicle.
Does the brokerage agreement contain an adequate disclosure
mechanism that not only will highlight the existence of a predispute
arbitration clause in an agreement but also explain its effect to prospec-
tive brokerage firm customers?1 Further, even when such a mechanism
is instituted, should there be an express prohibition against the current
practice in many brokerage firms of interposing mandatory arbitration
clauses as conditions precedent to opening certain types of trading
accounts? 12
Do sufficient and reliable means exist for notifying customers of
the available options and proper procedures when disputes arise?"3 In
the event the arbitration vehicle is chosen or required, do the options
include the possibility of proceeding in nonindustry sponsored arbitral
forums such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA)?" Should
they? Is there an effective and convenient process for acquiring infor-
mation and documents for case preparation prior to the arbitration
hearing?15 Within the context of the hearing, do the arbitration rules
provide the requisite accommodation between the need for flexibility
(in the interest of economy, convenience, and ascertainment of truth)
11. For a discussion of the importance of disclosure, the issues raised by it, and the effect of
the new rules, see infra notes 119-80 and accompanying text.
12. The following is an example of a typical mandatory predispute arbitration agreement
before the adoption of the new rules:
ARBITRATION. It is understood that the following agreement to arbitrate does not consti-
tute a waiver of the right to seek a judicial forum where such a waiver would be void under
the federal securities laws.
The undersigned agrees, and by carrying an account for the undersigned you agree, that
except as inconsistent with the foregoing sentence, all controversies which may arise between
us concerning any transaction or the construction, performance or breach of this or any
other agreement between us, whether entered into prior, on, or subsequent to the date
hereof, shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the Board of Governors of the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., or the Board of Governors of the American Stock Exchange, Inc., as
you may elect. If you do not make such election by registered mail addressed to [the broker-
age firm's legal and compliance department in New York City], within five days after demand
by [the brokerage firm] that you make such election, then [the brokerage firm] niay make
such election. Judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrators may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction thereof.
This provision appeared in the body of the trading agreement in type of the same character and
boldness as the other provisions of the agreement. For a discussion of mandatory predispute arbi-
tration agreements, see infra notes 121-43, 151-80 and accompanying text.
13, See infra notes 119-50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 181-202 and accompanying text.
15. Prehearing preparation is vital to full and fair presentation of the matters in dispute. For
a discussion of the provisions of the new rules that address the hearing preparation phase of arbi-
tration, see infra notes 203-10; see also Robbins, A Practitioner's Guide to Securities Arbitration,
in SECURITIEs ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 15, 124 (noting that "[a]djudication by ambush
had always been the major weakness of arbitration").
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on the one hand, and definiteness, thoroughness, and decorum, on the
other?"6 Additionally, are there effective means of balancing the com-
peting but important policies of avoiding arbitrator conflicts of interest,
and retaining arbitrators with sufficient experience to understand the
complex workings of the capital markets and the market regulatory sys-
tem, brokerage firm operations and procedures, and the ever expanding
panoply of investment devices? 17
Additional questions arise with respect to the application of legal
theories underlying claims brought to arbitration. To what extent, for
example, do the arbitrators understand the pertinent legal theories?
Even if they understand these theories, do they actively apply them? Is
anything lost if the theories are not applied specifically and knowledge-
ably? That is, should the arbitrators' judgments based on what is
"fair," "just," or merely "sensible" be a sufficient basis for an award?
Should written opinions accompany arbitration awards, and would such
opinions serve the public interest? More specifically, would written
opinions provide guidance to the securities industry and its current and
prospective customers concerning what are proper brokerage and cus-
tomer-investor standards of conduct? Would such opinions generate a
known and coherent body of jurisprudence in the field and specify the
basis of the decision to facilitate subsequent judicial review of awards in
proper instances? Are large, complex cases more deserving of strict ap-
plications of law, and perhaps more juridical evidentiary processes?
How might such processes be implemented? In this regard, should some
matters be referred by arbitration panels to the courts, and if so, what
standards should apply for referring appropriate cases?1 8
The questions set out above are among the more critical ones that
have generated extensive discussions by the Securities and Exchange
16. The classic advantages of arbitration are that it is convenient, economical, and generally
not laden with the complications and intricacies of court litigation. See, e.g., Arbitration Reform
Hearings, supra note 6, at 6 (statement of Stephen L. Hammerman, Executive Vice President, and
General Counsel, Merrill Lynch & Co.) (stating that "[a]rbitration of securities disputes brings
customers and firms prompt, affordable and just results; moreover, arbitration facilities are more
accessible to investors than the federal courts"). On the other hand, the more flexible, less strin-
gent nature of these proceedings, along with other features, are said by many to obscure the effec-
tiveness of the process. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 257-58
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. The thorny problem of conflicts of interest with respect to the arbitrator panel has re-
ceived considerable attention. It is the subject of amendments that will be analyzed in this Article.
See infra notes 195-224.
18. See Robbins, supra note 15, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 166; see
also Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 478-82. Chairman Ruder has requested the
SROs to evaluate many of these issues in order to promulgate effective rules governing the arbitra-
tion process.
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Commission (SEC or Commission);19 securities industry organizations
such as the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), the
Securities Industry Association (SIA), and the self-regulatory organiza-
tions (SROs);20 and various other organizations. These discussions have
culminated in the recent approval by the SEC of substantial revisions
to the previous regulatory scheme for arbitration of customer brokerage
disputes in industry sponsored arbitration forums."' This Article is in-
tended as a contribution to the ongoing attempts at improving the arbi-
tration process. The discussion will concentrate mainly on the new rules
and recent decisional law; additionally, however, treatment will be ac-
corded subjects not necessarily raised in those rules and decisions.
This Article has four main theses. First, because the Supreme
Court has skewed the avenues of choice for resolving disputes between
broker-dealers and customers decidedly in favor of securities arbitra-
tion, the arbitration system-most particularly those systems con-
ducted by the securities industry itself-must sustain a heavy burden
to create and effectuate an absolutely fair, efficient, and economical
process. Second, the new arbitration rules, as well as the enthusiasm
and resolve with. which the industry approached these revisions of the
prior rules, bespeak a significantly improved regime that is capable of
meeting that burden. Third, even this new regime can be improved, and
in the important, over-arching interests of investor protection, investor
confidence, and the integrity of capital markets, additional revisions
such as the ones suggested in this Article should be considered care-
fully. And fourth, the industry, the SEC, and the public must continue
to monitor and evaluate the securities arbitration process.
Part II of this Article explores the historical development of securi-
ties arbitration, initially analyzing its statutory underpinnings and the
evolution of applicable case law, and then explaining the complex, in-
teractive regulatory roles of the SROs and the SEC in the arbitration
process. The dynamic interplay of economic, judicial, legislative, and
regulatory forces in recent years has imposed upon securities arbitra-
tion the daunting burden of protecting the rights of investors and their
confidence in the capital markets without inhibiting the process of na-
tional economic growth through rigorous investment and finance activi-
19. The SEC has the statutory authority and mandate to regulate the securities markets, but
has given wide latitude to the securities industry, through its self-regulatory organizations, to make
and enforce the industry's own rules. See McMahon, 282 U.S. at 233; infra notes 102-18 and ac-
companying text.
20. For more extensive discussions of the role of these organizations in regulating the securi-
ties markets, see infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
21. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) i
84,414, at 80.099 (May 10, 1989).
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ties. Part III discusses issues that are crucial to the improvement of
arbitration procedures and their administration and sets forth specific
recommendations. The recommendations focus primarily on the need,
in certain instances, for a prohibition against mandatory arbitration
clauses; the desirability of allowing investors to choose to arbitrate
before the American Arbitration Association; the importance of certain
additional protections against arbitrator conflicts of interest; and the
need to develop rules governing the conduct of complex cases, including
the referral of cases to the courts.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION
2 2
A. Statutory and Judicial Background
The Federal Arbitration Act23 was intended to "'revers[e] centu-
ries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements'" by " 'plac[ing] arbi-
tration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts."' "24
Section 2 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
.. .or the refusal to perform the [contract] . . .or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract. . . or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.25
Further, section 3 of the Act provides that when a court determines
an issue before it is referable to arbitration, the court must stay its pro-
ceedings.26 Finally, section 4 of the Act allows a court to issue an order
22. Rather than replicate the development of this history already performed in other works,
this section simply summarizes that history in order to provide a reference point for discussions
later in this Article. For more extensive treatment of the development of the law in this area, see,
e.g., Bedell, Harrison & Harvey, The McMahon Mandate: Compulsory Arbitration of Securities
and RICO Claims, 19 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1 (1987); Note, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon:
The Diminishing Role of Courts in Securities Disputes, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 443; Comment, Secur-
ities Arbitration-The Supreme Court Resolves the Issue of Enforceability of Mandatory Arbi-
tration Clauses in Brokerage Contracts: Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 73 IowA L.
REV. 449 (1988).
23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
24. McMahon, 282 U.S. at 225-26 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-
11 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924))). H.. REP. No. 96 states, in
pertinent part:
Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply
to make the contracting parties live up to [their] agreement[s]. [They] can no longer refuse to
perform [their] contract[s] when it becomes disadvantageous to [them]. An arbitration agree-
ment is placed upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.
H.R. Rp. No. 96, supra, at 2.
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
26. Id. § 3; see McMahon, 282 U.S. at 226; Comment, Predispute Arbitration Clauses in a
Brokerage Firm's Customer Account Agreement, 14 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 907, 910 (1988).
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compelling arbitration when there has been a "failure, neglect, or re-
fusal" to cooperate with the arbitration agreement."
Despite the clear language of the Act and its legislative history,
courts frequently declined to enforce securities arbitration provisions
until well into the 1970s. s Wilko v. Swan29 is the most significant of the
cases reflecting this judicial reluctance.
In Wilko30 the Supreme Court held unenforceable a predispute
agreement to compel arbitration of a claim under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).' The Court's holding turned on
section 14 of the Securities Act, which declares void any "stipulation"
to waive compliance with that statute.3 2 The Wilko Court emphasized
that Congress enacted section 12 to provide investors with a "special
right to recover for misrepresentation which differs substantially from
the common-law action in that the seller is made to assume the burden
of proving lack of scienter."' Further, the Court observed that section
22 of the Securities Act,3 4 by conferring broad jurisdiction to sue, af-
fords substantial opportunities to investors to vindicate that right. 5
Thus, opined the Court, notwithstanding the congressional policy of the
Arbitration Act to provide for expeditious and economical relief in
27. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
28. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d
823 (10th Cir. 1978); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
29. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
30. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). Section 12(2) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who ... offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a pro-
spectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of
such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omis-
sion, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him . . ..
Id.
32. Id. Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n, provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988).
33. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1988).
35. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. Specifically, the Court stated:
The Act's special right is enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction-federal or
state-and removal from a state court is prohibited. If suit be brought in a federal court, the
purchaser has a wide choice of venue, the privilege of nation-wide service of process and the
jurisdictional $3,000 requirement of diversity cases is inapplicable.
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these disputes, the policy in the Securities Act promoting investor pro-
tection through provision of a judicial forum for dispute resolution
should prevail. 6
After Wilko, federal courts extended that case's nonarbitrability
holding to other sections of the Securities Act, as well as to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).37 This trend, however, even-
tually began to reverse, at least with respect to Exchange Act
arbitration enforceability.
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,38 for example, the Supreme Court
upheld the arbitrability of section 10(b) Exchange Act claims arising
out of international transactions. 9 Although the decision turned essen-
tially on the nature and circumstances of international commerce, cer-
tain dictum in Justice Potter Stewart's majority opinion was
particularly pertinent to advancing the trend favoring greater availabil-
ity of arbitration: "[A] colorable argument could be made that even the
semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case
before us."4
Thus, the Court implied that there may not be sufficient similarity
in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to provide a basis for ra-
tionally extending Wilko to Exchange Act cases. In fact, the Court
noted several significant differences: section 10(b) claims were implied
rather than express; the Exchange Act does not provide the broad grant
of state and federal jurisdiction as does the Securities Act; and the Ex-
change Act does not create a "special right."'41 All of these considera-
tions were central to the holding in Wilko.42
36. Id. at 438.
37. See, e.g., Raiford v. Buslease Inc., 745 F.2d 1419 (11th Cir. 1984); Surman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,
598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1988), has been the real focus of the case development in this area. Section 10(b) provides as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national se-
curities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
38. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
39. Id. at 519-20.
40. Id. at 513.
41. Id. at 513-14.
42. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431, 434-38.
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Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd43 marked another significant
development in the judicial trend favoring arbitration. Byrd involved
claims under state law and under sections 10(b), 15(c), and 20 of the
Exchange Act in federal district court by a plaintiff who had invested,
and quickly lost, over one hundred thousand dollars.44 Dean Witter, as-
suming the Exchange Act claims were nonarbitrable as a result of
Wilko, moved to sever only the state claims, requesting that action on
those arbitrable state claims be stayed until the federal claims were
resolved.45
Directly at issue was the applicability of the "intertwining doc-
trine," developed by the Fifth Circuit and adopted at the time by the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. 6 Under this doctrine, when arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims were factually and legally intertwined, then,
notwithstanding the strong federal policy of the Arbitration Act favor-
ing arbitration, courts should decline to require arbitration in order to
preserve exclusive jurisdiction over the nonarbitrable federal securities
claims. 7
The Byrd Court rejected the intertwining doctrine. The Court
stated that in the absence of a policy to the contrary expressed in an-
other federal aci or its legislative history, the Arbitration Act's pre-
sumption of arbitrability required that arbitration be allowed, in spite
of the specter of judicial inefficiency through bifurcated proceedings,
piecemeal litigation, increased expense, and other similar factors.4 8
Significantly, the issue regarding applicability of the Wilko holding
to Exchange Act claims also arose in Byrd, albeit collaterally. Although
the majority opinion stated in a footnote that it was not deciding this
issue, the opinion observed that "Wilko has retained considerable vital-
ity in the lower federal courts," those courts in several instances having
applied Wilko to section 10(b) Exchange Act claims.' 9 Justice Byron
White's concurring opinion disagreed, however, noting that "Wilko's so-
licitude for . . . the 'special right' established by Congress . . . is not
necessarily appropriate where the cause of action is judicially implied
and not so different from the common-law action. ' 50 Further, noted
Justice White, "the question [of Wilko's applicability] remains open,
and the contrary holdings of the lower courts must be viewed with some
43. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
44. Id. at 214.
45. Id. at 215.
46. See, e.g., Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977).
47. Id.
48. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217-21.
49. Id. at 215 n.1.
50. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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doubt."'"
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth,2 Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,5 3 and South-
land Corp. v. Keating,54 all supplemented Byrd by stressing the strong
federal policy creating a preference for arbitration. Nonetheless, there
had been no actual holding by the Supreme Court specifically resolving
the question of whether predispute arbitration clauses were enforceable
when the claim underlying the dispute was based on the Exchange Act.
The McMahon case addressed and answered that question directly.
In McMahon the plaintiffs filed claims against the defendants, a
brokerage firm and one of its registered representatives, based on state
law, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and section 1962 of the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).55 The complaint
alleged churning," unsuitability, 5  and misrepresentation.", The de-
fendants moved to enforce the arbitration clause of the brokerage
agreement. Significantly, the defendants' motion sought to have all
claims arbitrated, including those under section 10(b) and RICO, thus
placing directly in issue both the viability and the scope of Wilko. 9
Holding that the section 10(b) and RICO claims were arbitrable,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor reaffirmed the policy of the FAA favoring
arbitration. 0 O'Connor stressed that a party opposing arbitration must
demonstrate a conflicting or "contrary congressional command. . . 'de-
ducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history'" in order to
51. Id.
52. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
53. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
54. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
55. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 223 (1987).
56. Id. Churning is the practice whereby a broker makes excessive trades in a customer's
account solely to generate brokerage commissions. Thus the "broker[s] cause[] securities in [their]
customer's account to be bought and sold with a frequency too great in light of the customer's
financial needs, resources and investment objective." Robbins, supra note 15, in SECURITIES ARBI-
TRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 76; see also Poser, Options Account Fraud. Securities Churning in
a New Context, 39 Bus. LAw. 571, 573 (1984) (quoted in Robbins, supra note 15, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 76). "Churning occurs because many securities brokers play a
dual role as both investment advisers and salespersons and because of the compensation system
used in the securities industry." Id. See generally Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1980); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
57. McMahon, 282 U.S. at 223. Unsuitability refers to the failure of a broker to match the
customer with the proper investment, considering the customer's financial and other pertinent cir-
cumstances. See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1978); Za-
retsky v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 509 F. Supp. 68, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Poser, Civil Liability for
Unsuitable Recommendations, 19 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 67 (1986); see also infra note
174.
58. McMahon, 282 U.S. at 223.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 226.
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override that Act's mandate." The majority stated that, contrary to the
statutory scheme of the Securities Act of 1933 on which Wilko was
based, section 29(a) of the Exchange Act,6 2 "which declares void '[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compli-
ance with any provision of [the Act],'" only prohibits waivers of com-
pliance with the Exchange Act's provisions, and not waivers of
jurisdiction under section 27.63 Wilko was not seen as compelling a dif-
ferent result, because the Court in Wilko held that a "waiver [through
arbitration] of the 'right to select the judicial forum' was unenforceable
only because arbitration was judged inadequate to enforce the statutory
rights created by § 12(2) [of the Securities Act]."6 4
The McMahon Court also rejected the claim that giving effect to
arbitration provisions constitutes an impermissible waiver of the Ex-
change Act's substantive protections.6 The Court addressed numerous
criticisms leveled at the arbitration process, both in Wilko and gener-
ally, and concluded that arbitration does not effect a waiver of Ex-
change Act protections.66 Interestingly, the Court expressly declined to
overrule "Wilko's contrary conclusion under the Securities Act," citing
"stare decisis concerns. '6 7 Nonetheless, the Court refused to apply
Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act because of intervening regula-
tory developments.6 "
The Court also refused to agree with the claim that Congress's fail-
ure to address the issue of arbitrability of Exchange Act claims when it
amended the Exchange Act in 1975 was evidence of congressional "rati-
fication of Wilko's extension to Exchange Act claims."6 " Finally, the
RICO claims were held arbitrable on the grounds that "there is no in-
herent conflict between arbitration and the purposes underlying [sec-
tion] 1964(c) [of RICO]. Moreover, nothing in RICO's text or legislative
history otherwise demonstrates congressional intent to make an excep-
61. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988).
63. McMahon, 282 U.S. at 227 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988)).
64. Id. at 228-29 (citation omitted) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953)).
65. Id. at 229-34.
66. Id. at 231-34. The Court emphasized arbitration's improved regulatory underpinnings
and judicial rejection of many of the criticisms of arbitration made in Wilko. Id.
67. Id. at 234 (emphasis in original). The Court held that "[w]hile stare decisis concerns may
counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion under the Securities Act, we refuse to extend
Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act in light of these intervening regulatory developments." Id.
(emphasis in original).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 236. Specifically, the Court held "[t]he Wilko issue was left to the courts: it was
unaffected by the amendment. . . ." Id. at 238.
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tion to the Arbitration Act for RICO claims."70
After the McMahon holding, arbitration's centrality to brokerage
dispute resolution was uncontestable, and therefore its integrity as a
process had to be assured. As will be discussed below, earlier initiatives
to study and improve the process continued, but at more accelerated
and intense levels.7 ' In McMahon's wake, however, the Supreme Court
handed down a decision that some interpreted as a retreat from its pre-
vious, expansive rulings.
In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees7 2 the Su-
preme Court upheld a state court decision that denied a motion to com-
pel arbitration and granted a countervailing motion to stay arbitration.
The state court had based its holding on a state statute allowing such a
stay pending resolution of related litigation between a party to the arbi-
tration agreement and third parties not bound by the agreement. 3
The Volt case centered on a dispute over a California construction
contract between the Volt company and a university; under the con-
tract, Volt was to install a system of electrical conduits on the univer-
sity campus. The contract contained, in addition to an arbitration
agreement, a choice of law clause providing that "[tihe Contract shall
be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located."74
When a dispute arose over the contract's terms, Volt demanded arbitra-
tion; the university, on the other hand, filed suit in California Superior
Court, alleging fraud and breach of contract and joining two other par-
ties from whom the university sought indemnity.7 5 The motion to stay
arbitration, filed in response to the Volt company's motion to compel
arbitration, was based on a California Civil Procedure Code provision
permitting a court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related liti-
gation between a party to the arbitration agreement and third parties
not bound by it, when "there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact. '76
The Court accepted, without independent evaluation, the lower
70. Id. at 242.
71. See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
72. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
73. Id. at 1251-52.
74. Id. at 1251. The arbitration agreement provided, in pertinent part:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the parties to this contract,
arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration
in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association then prevailing unless the parties mutually agreed [sic] otherwise. . . . This
agreement to arbitrate . . . shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration
law.
Id. at 1251 n.1.
75. Id. at 1251.
76. Id. at 1251 n.3 (quoting CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982)).
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state court's conclusion that the parties intended the choice of law
clause to incorporate the California statutory provision on arbitration.7
Thus, agreed the Court, the parties intended for a stay of arbitration to
apply in circumstances contemplated under the state statute. The state
court's interpretation of the choice of law clause did not waive the par-
ties' rights under the FAA. Specifically, the Court held that "[section] 4
of the FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute
at any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that
'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties']
agreement.' "78
The Court also rejected arguments that the state court's interpreta-
tion violates the strong federal policy, abundantly and clearly expressed
in its recent cases, favoring arbitration and preempting conflicting state
laws.79 Indeed, the Court's surprisingly restrictive characterization of
prior case law was seen by some observers as a retrenchment.80
The dissent in Volt observed that "[a]pplying the California proce-
dural rule, which stays arbitration while litigation of the same issue
goes forward, means simply that the parties' dispute will be litigated
rather than arbitrated."81 Surely the majority were aware of this ulti-
mate outcome; they were equally aware of the numerous arguments
forcefully made in the dissent.82
It is not clear what interests the Court sought to promote in Volt.
Perhaps the Court viewed state law as deserving of regard, if not defer-
ence, in such circumstances. Perhaps the majority truly believed that
the parties subjectively intended that the particular state law provision
at issue should apply, although such an intent does not appear likely as
77. Id. at 1253-54.
78. Id. at 1253 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (emphasis in original)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1254-55.
81. Id. at 1259-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. The dissent opined that the majority clearly was entitled to review the state court's con-
struction of the choice of law clause. This power of review exists (1) because the Court always has
reserved the right to conduct its own independent review of private contract law, notwithstanding
the fact that interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, when there are
federal rights to be protected, id. at 1257, and (2) because the FAA creates substantive federal law
that is intertwined with the state law issues, meaning that the state court judgment cannot rest on
an "adequate and independent state ground" such as could bar review by the Supreme Court. Id.
at 1259-60. Additionally, the dissent expressed serious doubt as to whether the parties even re-
motely intended the interpretation rendered by the majority, and disagreed vehemently that the
majority's opinion reflects the "'healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,'" id. at
1259 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)), or
the command that the parties' "'intentions [be] generously construed as to issues of arbi-
trability,'" id. at 1260 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985)).
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a practical matter. 3 In any event, whether that decision is viewed as an
aberration, or as simply distinguishable, the Supreme Court soon re-
turned to its more general theme of direct and unequivocal support for
arbitration in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.
8 4
In Rodriguez the petitioners were individuals who had invested ap-
proximately four hundred thousand dollars in securities through the re-
spondent Shearson/American Express's brokerage department.8 5 When
the investment turned sour, the petitioners brought suit in federal dis-
trict court alleging their money was lost through unauthorized and
fraudulent transactions. The complaint asserted claims under federal
and state law, including violations under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act. 6 The district court ordered that all claims be submitted to arbitra-
tion except those under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, which, the
court stated, were required to be litigated in court under the holding in
Wilko . 7 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, conclud-
ing that Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Wilko have reduced
that case's holding to "obsolescence." '88
On appeal, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reverse
Wilko. The Court found "that Wilko was incorrectly decided and is in-
consistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal
statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business
transactions."8 9
The Supreme Court recognized in Rodriguez that the Wilko Court
faced a "difficult" decision because of the competing interests of the
Securities Act, which seeks to ensure a high level of protection for in-
vestors in securities, and the FAA, "which strongly favors the enforce-
83. It is possible, although not probable, that the parties specifically discussed the applica-
tion of the specific state law provision at issue when they negotiated and agreed upon the terms of
the overall contract. See Volt, 109 S. Ct. at 1260 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[T]here is no extrinsic
evidence of . . .[the parties'] intent . . . . [T]he provision of the contract at issue here was not
one that these parties drafted themselves." Id.
For a discussion of the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), which sets forth the rationale
for that court's conclusion that the Volt ruling is consistent with Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989), see infra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
84. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
85. Id. at 1918.
86. Id. at 1919.
87. Id.; see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
88. See Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1919; Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989). The Fifth Circuit followed its
decision in Noble v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating
that "McMahon undercuts every aspect of Wilko").
89. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
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ment of agreements to arbitrate as a means of securing 'prompt,
economical and adequate solution of controversies.' "9o The Rodriguez
Court immediately seized upon the Wilko Court's observation that
these competing interests are "'not easily reconcilable.' "91 The Court
then recounted the evolutionary path of court decisions, from what
Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals called "the
old judicial hostility to arbitration," through the steady succession of
cases eroding that view, culminating in the McMahon decision.92
The Rodriguez Court observed that the Wilko decision was
founded, first, on the belief that "'arbitration lacks the certainty of a
suit at law under the [Securities] Act to enforce [the buyer's] rights,'"
and second, on the "particularly valuable feature of the Securities Act"
providing buyers with "'a wider choice of courts and venue'" than is
ordinarily true.93 To these contentions, the Court replied:
Once the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings is set
to one side, it becomes clear that the right to select the judicial forum and the
wider choice of courts are not such essential features of the Securities Act that
[section] 14 is properly construed to bar any waiver of these provisions. Nor are
they so critical that they cannot be waived under the rationale that the Securities
Act was intended to place buyers of securities on an equal footing with sellers.9'
Thus, Rodriguez overturned Wilko for two important reasons.
First, the Court sought "'to correct a seriously erroneous interpretation
of statutory language."95 Second, it also wanted to remove the inconsis-
tency in treatment of claims under the two securities statutes that
"'constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme
governing transactions in securities.'96
B. Regulatory Background
1. The Self-Regulatory Role of the Securities Industry
The most important regulatory developments in arbitration began
in 1976, when the SEC's Office of Consumer Affairs, in pursuit of the
Commission's statutory mandate to regulate the securities markets,
sought to eliminate the variations in the SROs' arbitration rules. The
SEC solicited comments on the advisability of establishing a "uniform
90. Id. at 1919 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438).
91. Id. (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438).
92. See id. at 1920 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
93. Id. at 1919-20 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432, 435).
94. Id. at 1920.
95. See Neeseman, After McMahon and Rodriguez: The State Of The Law, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 217, 239 (quoting Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922).
96. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206
(1976)).
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system of dispute grievance procedures for the adjudication of small
claims.""7 Receipt of comments generated concern from the Commis-
sion that there is an "absence of a fully effective, responsive system for
the assertion and resolution of investor complaints with registered bro-
kerage firms . . . [and that] the individual investors may not have, in
every respect, the measure of protection anticipated by the federal se-
curities laws." 98
In April 1977 the securities industry formed the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration, which today consists of ten SROs, the Se-
curities Industry Association (a major trade association for the securi-
ties industry), and four members of the public."9 Eventually, SICA
developed a Uniform Code of Arbitration (Code) that the SROs then
adopted with the SEC's approval. The Code reputedly incorporates and
harmonizes various prior formal and informal rules, culminating in a
uniform set of procedures for initiating, processing, and resolving
claims. 100 As amended from time to time, the Code serves as the basic
source of rules on arbitration procedures in customer disputes before
the SROs. 1°0
2. The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Although the above described deference to securities industry ex-
pertise in the establishment of arbitration procedures has been the
SEC's usual practice,"°2 the ultimate responsibility and authority for
97. Setting Disputes Between Customers and Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No.
12,528 (June 9, 1976), reprinted in 9 SEC DOCKET 833-35 (1976); see Katsoris, The Arbitration of
a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 283 (1984); Katsoris, supra note 9, at 326.
For a brief description of the SEC's broad regulatory powers in this area, see infra note 99.
98. Exchange Act Release No. 12,974 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 80,806, at 87,102 (Nov. 11, 1976).
99. See Klein & Harkins, Significance for Investors and the SEC, 20 REV. SEC. & COMMODI-
TIES REG. 195,198 (1987). The following SROs are SICA members: the American (AMEX), Boston,
Cincinnati, Midwest, New York (NYSE), Pacific, and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). See Katsoris, supra note 97, at 283 n.13; Katsoris, supra
note 9, at 362 n.8.
100. See Katsoris, supra note 97, at 284; Katsoris, supra note 9, at 363-64; Klein & Harkins,
supra note 99, at 198. SICA also prepared an explanatory Procedures Booklet for prospective
claimants. See Katsoris, supra note 97, at 284.
101. See supra notes 99-100.
102. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 684-85 (1983).
Although appropriate provisions on registration and fraud-prevention furnish an indispensa-
ble foundation for an adequate system of control, they must be supplemented by regulation
on an ethical plane in order "to protect the investor and the honest dealer alike from dishon-
est and unfair practices by the submarginal element in the industry" and "to cope with those
methods of doing business which, while technically outside the area of definite illegality, are
nevertheless unfair both to customer and to decent competitor, and are seriously damaging to
the mechanism of the free and open market." And regulation of the ethics of an industry
1216 [Vol. 43:1199
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regulating securities market activities still reposes in the Commission.
So significant are these powers that the Supreme Court in McMahon
based its holding in part upon both their presence and breadth. The
Court described the powers as including both the expansive power to
ensure the adequacy of arbitration procedures used by the SROs by
monitoring the procedures' consistency with the requirements of the
Exchange Act, 03 and the power to "abrogate, add to, and delete from"
any SRO rule if the Commission finds such changes necessary or appro-
priate to further the Act's objectives.10
The SEC has invoked its broad powers from time to time in the
issuance of rules and policy statements. Notably, notwithstanding the
deference usually accorded the industry, some of the Commission's im-
portant initiatives prior to McMahon reflected a degree of cautiousness
toward arbitration, which remains the industry's preferred dispute reso-
lution device.
Rule 15c2-2, 0o for example, reflected the SEC's concern that cus-
means a substantial degree of self-regulation, properly supervised by government.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1938) and H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1938)). The legislative history of the 1975
amendments to the Exchange Act states, in relevant part, as follows:
Industry organizations, i.e., the exchanges and the NASD, are delegated governmental
power in order to enforce, at their own initiative, compliance by members of the industry with
both the legal requirements laid down in the Exchange Act and ethical standards going be-
yond those requirements.
The SEC is charged with supervising the exercise of this self-regulatory power in order to
assure that it is used effectively to fulfill the responsibilities assigned to the self-regulatory
agencies, and that it is not used in a manner inimical to the public interest or unfair to
private interests.
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 179,
201.
103. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987).
104. Id. at 233; see also Barnes, NASD Disciplinary Proceedings, 21 REV. SEC. & COMMODI-
TIES REG. 161, 161 (1988).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act) provides a comprehensive system of regu-
lation of the securities industry through the self-regulatory organizations (SROs), the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), and the stock exchanges. Indeed,
beginning with the Maloney Act [Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 780(c)(2), (3) (1988))], SROs were delegated wide-ranging rulemaking
and regulatory authority, but with broad oversight authority and responsibility vested in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This reliance on supervised self-regulation was
reaffirmed and strengthened when the Act was extensively amended in 1975. Those amend-
ments gave an even greater oversight role to the SEC.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also S. REP. No. 75, supra note 102, at 23, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 201 (stating that "[tihe self-regulatory organizations exercise authority
subject to SEC oversight. . . [having] no authority to regulate independently of the SEC's con-
trol"). For a general discussion of the SEC's overall authority to regulate the securities markets,
see L. Loss, supra note 102, at 667-733.
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1988); see also Exchange Act Release No. 20,397 [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,356 (Nov. 18, 1983). Rule 15c2-2 was
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tomers were being urged to accept arbitration clauses in brokerage con-
tracts without being told that such clauses were "not enforceable with
respect to claims arising under the federal securities laws."'' 0 Under
this rule, a broker-dealer's and customer's entry into an arbitration
agreement that failed to disclose the nonenforceability of such agree-
ments in the context of federal securities law claims constituted a
"fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act."'10 7
Nevertheless, the SEC changed directions completely in McMahon,
in which it supported the securities industry's arguments that arbitra-
tion clauses should be accorded a broad scope of applicability. 0 In-
proposed in Exchange Act Release No. 19,813 11982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,356, at 85,996 (May 26, 1983) (requiring that brokerage agreements must contain "ade-
quate disclosure that [arbitration] clauses are not enforceable with respect to claims arising under
the federal securities laws"). Rule 15c2-2 provided in relevant part:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker or dealer to
enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports to bind the customer to the
arbitration of future disputes between them arising under the federal securities laws, or to
have in effect such an agreement, pursuant to which it effects transactions with or for a
customer.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1988). As a result of Rule 15c2-2, arbitration clauses generally contained
prefatory language similar to the following: "ARBITRATION. It is understood that the following
agreement to arbitrate does not constitute a waiver of the right to seek a judicial forum where such
a waiver would be void under the federal securities laws." See supra note 12.
106. Exchange Act Release No. 19,813, supra note 105, at 85,966-67. In this release, the Com-
mission explained that its somewhat more stringent position reflected not a disenchantment with
arbitration but a strong concern with industry practices that tended to compromise investor
protection:
This action is consistent with the Commission's strong endorsement of fairly administered
arbitration procedures as the most cost effective means of resolving certain disputes between
broker-dealers and their customers.
Nevertheless, the Commission is concerned with a widespread industry practice
which conflicts with legislative history, a thirty-year line of case law, and Commission
releases.
Id. Strongly implied here was the Commission's view that Wilko applied to Securities Act and
Exchange Act claims alike.
107. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1988). In adopting this rule, the Commission clearly seemed to
accept the view that Wilko applied to all federal securities law claims:
Wilko v. Swan and subsequent cases have held that Congress had determined that public
customers should have available the special protection of the federal courts for the resolution
of disputes arising under the federal securities laws, and that under the anti-waiver provi-
sions of those laws, that protection may not be waived in advance by contract of the parties.
Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, supra note 105, at 86,357 (citation omitted) (emphasis added);
see also Klein & Harkins, supra note 99, at 198. In McMahon, however, the Court noted the SEC's
position that promulgation of Rule 15c2-2, along with statements implying that Wilko applied to
all federal securities act claims, was "premised on the Commission's assumption, based on court of
appeals decisions following Wilko, that agreements to arbitrate Rule lob-5 claims were not, in fact,
arbitrable." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234 n.3 (citing Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission
as Amicus Curiae at 18 n.13).
108. Justice Harry Blackmun's concurrence and dissent in McMahon makes note of "the
Securities and Exchange Commission's newly adopted position that arbitration procedures in the
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deed, after the McMahon decision, the SEC rescinded Rule 15c2-2,
stating that "the Court's reasoning [in McMahon] raised questions re-
garding the continuing vitality of. .. [the Wilko] decision .. . [and]
the Commission believes that Rule 15c2-2 is no longer appropriate or
accurate and, accordingly, should be rescinded."'10 9
Thus, the SEC shifted from a broad interpretation of Wilko to an
equally broad-and perhaps equally questionable-interpretation of
McMahon. With its action, the SEC implied, particularly through its
rescission of Rule 15c2-2, that McMahon overruled Wilko. At the time
of the rescission, however, it was not absolutely clear that McMahon
accomplished this task." ° Indeed, the conclusion that the McMahon
holding left Wilko intact as to section 12(2) Securities Act claims finds
support in the following language from McMahon: "While stare decisis
concerns may counsel against upsetting Wilko's contrary conclusion
under the Securities Act [regarding the suitability of arbitration as a
vehicle for vindicating investors' rights under that statute], we refuse to
extend Wilko's reasoning to the Exchange Act in light of these inter-
vening regulatory developments.""'
Therefore, it was at least possible after McMahon that Securities
Act claims remained nonarbitrable. This potentiality, combined with
the rescission of Rule 15c2-2, meant that investors might face the same
problems that the rule sought to solve. They could consent to, and pro-
ceed with, the arbitration process, quite unaware that some claims di-
rected against brokerage firms may (or, more properly, must) be
asserted in court and that court jurisdiction is not abrogated by the
existence of an arbitration clause. Further, the confidence of these in-
vestors' in the integrity of the capital markets could be adversely af-
fected by fears that their rights have been relegated, by both the
Supreme Court and the SEC, to biased, industry controlled tribunals
for justice. 1 2
securities industry and the Commission's oversight of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs)
have improved greatly since Wilko was decided." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 243 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
109. Exchange Act Release No. 25,034 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,163, at 88,886 (Oct. 15, 1987).
110. See Klein & Harkins, supra note 99, at 196. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Rodriguez. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989);
supra notes 84-96. Rodriguez resolved a split in the circuits. Compare Rodriguez De Quijas v.
Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "McMahon completely
undermined Wilko"), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) and Peterson v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988) with Chang v. Lin 824 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1987) (Wilko remains
good law in absence of express overruling by the Supreme Court) and Osterneck v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 841 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1988).
111. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234 (emphasis added).
112. See Klein & Harkins, supra note 99, at 198-99 (noting that in the past the SEC has
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Subsequent developments, however, may mitigate these problems.
First, the Rodriguez holding obviated all confusion about available fo-
rums by clarifying that no claims under any of the securities laws are
excluded from arbitration and reserved for exclusive jurisdiction in the
courts. 113 Second, immediately after the McMahon decision, the SEC,
armed with the results of an in-depth study of SRO arbitration proce-
dures, began a major process to reform those procedures." 4 Choosing to
conduct this process through SICA, the Commission set forth fifteen
recommendations "designed to provide reasonable assurance of the pro-
cedural fairness of SRO-sponsored arbitration."" 5 Additionally, the
Commission has requested that the SROs "review the issues raised by
the current use of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements by
your member firms."""' Study and debate have proceeded accordingly,
with several proposals emerging for consideration.'" On May 10, 1989,
the SEC approved proposals submitted by the New York Stock Ex-
change, Inc. (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD), and the American Stock Exchange, Inc. (AMEX)." 8
"recogni[zed] . . . that effectively forcing investors to arbitrate their disputes might reinforce the
investors' 'doubt [as to] the impartiality of officials associated with self-regulatory organizations
and. . . hesitat[ion] to use the arbitration facilities' "); see also Exchange Act Release No. 15,984
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,121, at 81,974, 81, 978 (June 26, 1979). Re-
lease No. 15,984 states:
If broker dealers do not provide adequate disclosure about the limited enforceability of
predispute arbitration agreements, or misrepresent the meaning of the arbitration clause in
the context of a dispute, investors may be effectively deprived of any right they may have to
choose an alternative forum at the time a dispute arises.
Id.
113. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1920. What the holding did for overall investor confidence in
the dispute resolution process, however, is another matter. Given the complaints from some that
arbitration is biased against investors after McMahon, the Rodriguez holding can only have
strengthened those views. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 10.
114. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of David S. Ruder, SEC
Chairman) (referring to a letter dated Sept. 10, 1987, from Richard G. Ketchum, Director of the
SEC Division of Market Regulation, to all SICA members).
115. Id. Generally, the recommendations addressed the areas of arbitrator conflicts of inter-
est and overall ethicality, arbitrator competence, discovery procedures, public disclosure of perti-
nent award and hearing information, claimant education and prerogative to go to the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), broker discipline, and rules for large cases.
116. Letter from Chairman David S. Ruder to all SROs and all SICA members (July 8, 1988).
117. The proposals submitted on these issues by the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. are the most significant and encompassing pro-
posals and therefore will be the focus of this Article. In general, these proposals are developed on a
cooperative basis through SICA, and then adopted, with relatively little if any variation, by the
SROs.
118. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, at 80,099.
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C. Conclusion on the Development of Securities Arbitration
Various developments have thrust securities arbitration to the fore-
front as the primary path for resolution of disputes between customers
and their brokers and dealers. These developments repose significant
prerogative in the SROs to make and enforce the procedures for effec-
tuating this process, subject to SEC oversight. This Article now will ad-
dress some crucial issues regarding arbitration procedures and their
administration.
III. IMPROVEMENT OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURES AND THEIR
ADMINISTRATION
A. Initial Disclosure and the Investor's Right to Choose
Two central and interrelated problems in securities arbitration are
the investor's awareness of the presence and effect of arbitration clauses
in brokerage agreements and the investor's right to choose whether to
accept or reject such clauses. Critics of arbitration often have observed
that preliminary dealings between prospective investors and broker-
dealers in the past never provided for full and emphatic disclosure re-
garding the means of resolving disputes or the choice of those means.11
Thus predispute arbitration clauses, which provide for waiver of an in-
vestor's right to pursue court remedies for violations of the brokerage
agreement, usually existed quite inconspicuously amidst the agree-
ment's other terms, unexplained by the presiding registered representa-
tive. Only later did the existence and significance of the clause become
clear, perhaps at the time of the dispute, or in a motion to dismiss an
investor's court action in favor of arbitration pursuant to the arbitra-
tion clause. 120 Proposed solutions to this problem have run the gamut
from requirements of prominent disclosure of the clause and its effect
to legal prohibitions of mandatory predispute arbitration clauses as
conditions precedent to effecting trades in the brokerage account.
119. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 486 (statement of David S. Ruder,
SEC Chairman). Chairman Ruder, not even considered a critic of arbitration, notes that "it is
apparent that many customers are not provided with clear and informative disclosure of either the
existence or meaning of predispute arbitration clauses." Id. The new rules address this problem.
See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
120. For a typical example of the point at which a brokerage firm makes its most noticeable
statement about the presence and effect of the arbitration clause, see McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222-
23. Once a claim is threatened or actually filed in court, the firm's self-interest is served best, of
course, by asserting the clause.
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1. Legal Proscriptions of Mandatory Predispute Arbitration Clauses
One of the investor protection approaches often proposed in securi-
ties arbitration debates would make it illegal to require mandatory
predispute arbitration clauses in brokerage agreements as a condition
precedent to trading under such agreements and requiring disclosure as
to the nature and implications of a prospective customer's choices. Per-
haps the clearest expression of the rationale for such a measure came
from Michael J. Connolly, Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, announcing the filing of state regulations directly on
point. 2' Specifically, the Massachusetts regulations required that a bro-
ker disclose the legal implication of an arbitration clause so that cus-
tomers signing the agreement could understand the full ramifications of
giving up their right to have their claims heard in court.'22 The regula-
tions also mandated that prior to the time a contract is signed between
an investor and a broker, the broker negotiate to do business even if the
customer chooses not to sign the arbitration agreement. Without such
protection for small investors, the vastly superior economic power of
brokers might force small investors to accept an arbitration clause or
forfeit the opportunity to invest.12 3 Connolly added that "[tihese regu-
lations not only provide investors with a choice regarding arbitration
agreements, but . . . open[] up the dispute resolution process," and
that "[i]nvestor confidence in a fair and open system is vital to a
healthy investment economy.""4
Even before they became effective, the Massachusetts regulations
were overturned in litigation brought by members of the securities in-
dustry. A Massachusetts federal district court, in Securities Industry
Association v. Connolly,2 5 took its lead from McMahon and other re-
cent cases favoring enforceability of arbitration agreements. The court
held that the regulations violated the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution because they were preempted by the FAA. 2 ' The
court concluded that the regulations did not merely supplement state
law concerning matters "collateral to the validity and enforceability of
121. See MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 12.204(a)(2)((G)(1)(a)-(c) (1988) (statement of Secre-
tary of State Michael Joseph Connolly); see also Massachusetts to Be First to Ban Forced Arbi-
tration, PR Newswire, Sept. 21, 1988 (stating that the North American Securities Administrators
Association reported that (1) 16 states were ready to follow Massachusetts' lead in enacting such
regulations, and (2) about 9 out of 10 options and margin accounts were covered by mandatory
arbitration agreements, as were 39% (about 5 million) of the cash accounts held by individuals).
122. See MASs. REG. CODE tit. 950, § 12.204(a)(2)(G) (1)(a)-(c) (1988).
123. Id. (statement of Secretary of State Michael Joseph Connolly).
124. Id. (statement of Secretary of State Michael Joseph Connolly).
125. 703 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 861 (1990).
126. Id. at 161.
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arbitration agreements.1127 Rather, the regulations went "to the heart
of the process of forming contracts to arbitrate," and "single[d] out ar-
bitration agreements for more demanding standards than are imposed
by the general law of contracts in Massachusetts.' 1 28
In determining "'whether Congress [in enacting the Arbitration
Act] (expressly) did or (impliedly) meant to displace state law or state
law concepts,' ,,129 the court noted that "[als a matter of logic, [the]
analysis . . . focuses on whether the state regulations 'single out arbi-
tration agreements' for special treatment"'180 and thus "eviscerate" the
Act's purpose of placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as
other contracts.' 3' "Because the ...unique Massachusetts securities
arbitration regulations impose conditions on the formation and execu-
tion of arbitration agreements [that] are not part of the generally appli-
cable contract law of Massachusetts, they cannot be given effect under
the Federal Arbitration Act.' 13 2 Nor do the various savings clauses in
the federal securities laws, which permit concurrent state and federal
regulation of the securities business, "provide a 'contrary Congressional
command' permitting state Blue Sky regulators to establish special con-
ditions applicable to arbitration contracts in derogation of the direc-
tions of the Federal Arbitration Act."' 33
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding.' The First Circuit essentially
adopted the district court's reasoning based on McMahon and its con-
tributing predecessors, and buttressed that reasoning with references to
the Rodriguez holding. The court noted that "just this year, in the
course of overruling Wilko v. Swan. . .the [Supreme] Court again em-
phasized 'the strong language' of the FAA and noted the heavy burden
borne by opponents of the arbitral alternative.' 35
Observing that the language of the Arbitration Act "sweeps broadly
and brooks little reservation," and that therefore "the Court has almost
always given the Act a reading which is both broad and deep,"'38 the
appellate court even attempted to reconcile the Supreme Court's hold-
127. Id. at 147.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 150 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625-26 (lst Cir. 1987)).
130. Id. at 151 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 723 F.2d 155,
158 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 153.
133. Id. at 154 (quoting Kroog v. Mait, 712 F.2d 1148, 1153 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1007 (1984)).
134. Connolly, 883 F.2d at 114.
135. Id. at 1118 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 1118-19.
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ing in Volt with the McMahon-Rodriguez line of High Court decisions.
The First Circuit reasoned that the Volt Court merely ruled that inter-
preting a choice of law clause to apply state rules for conducting arbi-
tration does not offend any rule of liberal construction or any policy
embodied in the FAA, particularly when the state rules are designed to
encourage use of arbitration.137 Because the choice of law provision in
Volt did not impinge on the validity or enforceability of an arbitral con-
tract, the California regulation filled a gap in the FAA. 138 According to
the First Circuit, however, the Massachusetts regulations undermined
the presumption of validity that the Arbitration Act confers on arbitra-
tion contracts generally.3 9 Based on this reasoning, the First Circuit
decided that because the Massachusetts regulations treated standard
form predispute arbitration agreements in the securities industry more
severely than other standard form contracts under Massachusetts law,
and because the policies underlying the Regulations and their method
of enforcement conflicted with the national policy favoring arbitration,
the state scheme is preempted by the federal plan.140
Thus, to the extent Connolly is affirmed by the Supreme Court,
state action in this arena may be precluded, or at least, severely re-
stricted.' 4 ' Although the case is expected eventually to be heard by the
Supreme Court, McMahon and Rodriguez augur strongly in favor of the
High Court sustaining the lower courts' holdings. This expectation re-
sults from the emphasis those two opinions place on the federal policy
promoting enforceability of arbitration under the FAA.'42 Only the Volt
137. Id. at 1119 n.3. The court specifically held:
Volt is not to the contrary. There, the Court ruled that "interpreting a choice-of-law clause to
make applicable state rules governing the conduct of arbitration-rules which are manifestly
designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process-simply does not offend the rule of liberal
construction . . . nor does it offend any other policy embodied in the FAA." . . IT]he
choice-of-law provision in Volt did not impinge on the validity or enforceability of the arbitral
contract. The California regulation filled in an interstice in the FAA, whereas the Regulations
here at issue plainly undermine the presumption of validity that the Act meant to confer on
arbitration contracts generally.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 109 S. Ct.
1248, 1254 (1989)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1124.
141. In the wake of the Connolly opinions, Massachusetts officials now apparently are look-
ing to the federal arena for action. See Massachusetts May Seek Federal Action Against Securi-
ties Arbitration, McGraw-Hill News, Sept. 1, 1989. Martin Meehan, Massachusetts Deputy
Secretary of State, has commented that the State will "push for action at the federal level" to
prevent brokerage firms from pressuring customers to give up their rights to sue, and that the
State remains "committed to the notion that investors ought to have the right to sue their brokers.
. . . We feel Congress needs to act." Id.
142. 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1920 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 225-26, 232 (1987). Early in the Connolly litigation an attorney for the securities industry has
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holding would appear to articulate even remotely any basis upon which
the Massachusetts regulation could be upheld, and in this regard, the
First Circuit's attempt at harmonizing that case with the Supreme
Court's more affirmatively proarbitration decisions certainly is conven-
ient and could be persuasive.14 1
2. Disclosure As a Protective Device
Should the Supreme Court uphold the decisions of the lower courts
in Connolly, any action prohibiting mandatory predispute arbitration
clauses may have to come from the SEC or Congress. At present, how-
ever, the only active proposals or enactments at the federal level focus,
not upon the prohibition alternative, but upon disclosure of the terms
and implications of those clauses."" In congressional testimony, the
Chairman of the SEC explained the problem and the need surrounding
the disclosure issue: "[I]t is apparent that many customers are not pro-
vided with clear and informative disclosure of either the existence or
meaning of predispute arbitration clauses. The SROs should examine
ways to improve disclosure at the time of account opening. "145
The SROs have responded to the various expressions of concern
about the quality of initial disclosure with improvements in the rules
relating to the use of predispute arbitration agreements. Generally,
under the rules the arbitration clause in a brokerage contract must be
expressed orally to the Author the opinion that whatever the outcome at the circuit court level, a
further appeal probably will be sought by the losing party. On November 29, 1989, the State of
Massachusetts filed a formal petition for certiorari in Connolly, seeking to have the United States
Supreme Court review the case. (No. 89-894). Additionally, on January 22, 1990, the Supreme
Court invited the Solicitor General of the United States to file a brief expressing the views of the
United States concerning the holding of the First Circuit in Connolly. See 22 Sec. Reg. & Law
Rept., No. 4, p. 134 (Jan. 26, 1990); Court Seeks U.S. View on Arbitration, Wash. Post, Jan. 23,
1990, at D5, col. 1.
143. See Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1119 n.3; see also supra note 137.
144. See supra note 141. For examples of the disclosure provisions of the new SEC rules, see
infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. As to congressional action, H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) died in Committee during the last Congress. See 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,106 (100th
Cong.). There have been signs, however, of possible legislative action. In a letter dated Feb. 5,
1990, Representatives John Dingell (D-Mich.), Chairperson of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, and Edward Markey (D-Mass.), Chairperson of the House Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications and Finance, asked the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to undertake a compre-
hensive review of SRO arbitration. Representatives Dingell and Markey observed in the letter that
"[s]ecurities arbitration continues to be a thorn in the side of the small investor, who sees it as
unfair and coercive." Their hope is that the GAO study "will provide us with a clear assessment of
the effects on the individual investor . . . and what if anything Congress can do to address the
continuing concerns of those investors." See Hinden, GAO Asked to Investigate Securities Arbi-
tration Issues, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1990, at D1, col. 1; Wall Street Letter, Institutional Investor,
Feb. 12, 1990, at 2.
145. Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 486 (statement of David S. Ruder, SEC
Chairman).
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highlighted and must contain highlighted prefatory language, printed in
outline form, stating the following:
(a) Arbitration is final and binding on the parties.
(b) The parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in court, including the right
to jury trial.
(c) Prearbitration discovery is generally more limited than and different from court
proceedings.
(d) The arbitrators' award is not required to include factual findings or legal rea-
soning and any party's right to appeal or to seek modification of rulings by the
arbitrators is strictly limited.
(e) The panel of arbitrators will typically include a minority of arbitrators who
were or are affiliated with the securities industry.'"
The rules impose further requirements. These provisions mandate
that: there be a highlighted statement immediately preceding the signa-
ture line that the agreement contains a predispute arbitration clause; 47
the customer receive, and acknowledge receipt of, a copy of the
clause;14 there not be any condition in the agreement limiting or con-
tradicting any SRO rules, limiting a party's right to file a claim, or lim-
iting an arbitrator's ability to make an award;149 and those rules shall
only apply to new agreements. 5 '
3. Analysis of Mandatory Arbitration-Striking the Proper Balance
Adoption of the new disclosure rules was proper and will benefit
investors and the capital markets. The rules are calculated to provide
clear and fair warning to prospective investors about the dispute resolu-
146. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., ARBITRATION RULES, art. XI, Rule 637(1)(a)-(e), reprinted in 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2637 (May 10, 1989) [hereinafter NYSE ARBITRATION RULES]; Amend-
ment to National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §
21(f)(1)(a)-(e) (note that this rule is placed in the part of the NASD Rules dealing with broker-
dealer conduct and practice, whereas the other new NASD rules appear in the NASD Code of
Arbitration Procedure); AMERICAN STOCK EXCH., INC., OFFICE RULES, Rule 427(a)(I)-(5), reprinted
in 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9447 (May 10, 1989) (also appearing in a section different from
the main body of arbitration rules). See generally Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21,
at 80-099-81,108 (approving proposed new rules).
147. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 627 (2). The Rule states that:
"Immediately preceding the signature line, there shall be a statement which shall be highlighted
that the agreement contains a pre-dispute arbitration clause. The statement shall also indicate at
what page and paragraph the clause is located." Id.
148. See, e.g., id. Rule 637(3). The Rule specifies: "A copy of the agreement containing any
such clause shall be given to the customer who shall acknowledge receipt thereof on the agreement
or on a separate document." Id.
149. See, e.g., id. Rule 637(4). The Rule stipulates that: "No agreement shall include any
condition which limits or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory organization or limits the
ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitrators to make any
award." Id.
150. See, e.g., id. Rule 637(5), which states that: "The requirements of this section shall ap-
ply only to new agreements signed by an existing or new customer of a member or member organi-
zation after September 7, 1989." Id.
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tion device they would be electing at the time they enter into brokerage
agreements, and correspondingly, about what waivers of choice to a fo-
rum would apply.151 In developing and proposing these rules, the SROs
responded to past circumstances that established the need for greater
investor protection in the pre-entry phase of the brokerage engage-
ment.152 By doing so, the SROs seized the opportunity to express em-
phatically the industry's willingness to operate in a fair, impartial
dispute resolution environment.
By proposing these significant protections in the form of prominent
disclosure requirements, however, the industry may have sought to
avoid adoption of a more stringent measure, such as a proscription
against mandatory arbitration agreements. Having now avoided such a
stricture, and with the new rules now in effect, certain critical issues
arise under this new regulatory pattern. First, the sufficiency of the dis-
closure rules must remain a matter of substantial concern until experi-
ence has demonstrated that they are satisfactory. 153 Second, with no
specific regulatory guidance or requirements with respect to mandatory
predispute arbitration agreements, open questions remain as to
how-and even whether-the industry will seek to establish an equita-
ble balance between the competing interests: investors' prerogatives to
choose the best forum in which to vindicate their rights and a brokerage
firm's prerogative to condition its services on such mandatory agree-
ments in order to secure reasonable risk minimization and economy for
itself.
a. The Problem
SEC Chairman David S. Ruder has noted that mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses are imposed most frequently in margin and option trading
agreements, and in doing so has described the perspectives of both bro-
ker-dealer firms and investors in relation to the aforementioned balanc-
151. See supra notes 29-36, 67-69 and accompanying text.
152. For example, the NYSE proposal was submitted on October 14, 1988, just over one year
after the September 10, 1987 letter from SEC Director of Market Regulation Richard Ketchum,
and about three months after Chairman Ruder's July 8, 1988 letter. See supra notes 115-17.
153. See Karmel, Arbitration and the Demise of Wilko v. Swan, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1989, at 3,
col. 1. Roberta S. Karmel, a former SEC commissioner and former public director of the NYSE,
states:
Whether SEC oversight will give SRO maintained arbitration facilities greater credibility
than they have previously enjoyed remains to be seen. .
Perhaps the very controversy over securities industry arbitration, which the plaintiffs' bar
is likely to keep alive, will prove its salvation. The continued scrutiny that it is likely to
receive should prompt SROs and arbitrators to give investors a fair break.
Id. at 4, col. 4.
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ing question.' Essentially, broker-dealers argue that margin
accounts'55 put them at greater financial risk, that options156 and mar-
gin accounts will be more technically complicated than standard cash
accounts, and that such accounts are more likely to produce litiga-
tion."'57 From the broker-dealer perspective, arbitration provides a mea-
sure of risk management, an adjudicating body more highly trained in
securities matters, and a less expensive forum for frequent dispute reso-
lution.158 Advocates of customer choice, on the other hand, focus on the
fiduciary responsibility and customer suitability issues that margin and
options accounts may generate, issues that may be more appropriate for
court adjudication. 59
The debate over mandatory predispute arbitration clauses should
not necessarily cease with the enactment of the new disclosure rules.
Because a central objective of the securities laws is investor protec-
tion-including the right to choose an effective forum-every effort
should be made to ensure such protection to the greatest degree, in let-
ter and in spirit, while minimizing any associated burdens on the indus-
try.1 0 This emphasis not only may require more than disclosure, but
154. Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 484 (statement of David S. Ruder, SEC
Chairman).
155. See generally R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 18.16, at 446 (1989).
A margin transaction simply involves borrowing money from your broker to enable you to buy
more shares of marketable securities. By obtaining such a loan, an investor may make a larger
investment than he or she could have without the loan. [T]he loan is secured by a lien of the
securities purchased ...
Id.; see also A. PESSIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 302-04 (1985).
156. See generally M. THOMSETT, INVESTMENT AND SECURITIES DICTIONARY 195 (1986) (stating
that an option is "a contract allowing the holder (buyer) to purchase or sell 100 shares of a secur-
ity, . . . [that] ha[s] a finite life, and become[s] worthless following an expiration date").
157. Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 484-85.
158. Id.
159. Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 484-85 (statement of David S. Ruder,
SEC Chairman).
160. The SEC did not put pressure on the SROs specifically to adopt prohibitions on
mandatory arbitration agreements. The Commission's July 8, 1988 letter to the SROs noted: "In
the Commission's view, for the brokerage industry generally to condition access to its services on
the execution of a mandatory arbitration clause, as appears to be the case at least for margin and
option accounts, raises serious policy issues." Letter from Chairman David S. Ruder to all SROs
and all SICA members (July 8, 1988).
Rather than impose specific rules, however, the Commission requested that the SROs "review
the issues raised by the current use of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements" and "report
back . . . on your conclusions." Id. The SROs appear to have concluded that prohibition of such
agreements was unnecessary, or undesirable, and that any problems could be resolved through
more prominent disclosures in the brokerage agreement. The SEC's initiative appears to have ema-
nated from the various political pressures surrounding this issue, as well as a study conducted of
65 broker-dealers that account for 90% of all customer trading accounts in the United States. The
study found that 96% of the margin accounts, 95% of the options accounts, and 39% of the cash
accounts at the firms studied had mandatory clauses. This result prompted Chairman Ruder to
observe that "[t]he reported trend toward the use of mandatory predispute clauses for cash ac-
1228 [Vol. 43:1199
SECURITIES ARBITRATION
may eliminate several less affirmative courses that fall short of a direct
prohibition on mandatory arbitration clauses. For example, a free-mar-
ket oriented approach otherwise might be proposed, wherein consumer
expressions of disapproval would encourage competition among firms,
thus creating a market for brokerage agreements without mandatory ar-
bitration clauses, or discouraging the use of such clauses altogether. The
SEC appeared to suggest such an approach when it adopted the new
arbitration rules: "Under the circumstances presented, the Commission
is reluctant to dictate the terms of a fully disclosed agreement between
a broker-dealer and a customer. Investors currently have access to basic
brokerage services without agreeing to pursue any future disputes
through arbitration, rather than through the courts."''
These observations, however, are of little or no relevance, because
even the Commission "recognizes that investors do not have such access
with respect to margin and options accounts"-the types of accounts on
which mandatory arbitration is usually imposed. 6 2 The Commission ob-
serves, however, "that with respect to margin accounts, the firms' sepa-
rate lending relationship with the customer may increase the
desirability of agreeing in advance that disputes will be resolved
through arbitration."'16 3 Additionally, the Commission believes that the
combination of disclosure and free-market forces could obviate any real
or perceived threat to investor protection because "the improved disclo-
sure provided in the rules will . . . alert investors as to the conse-
quences of signing predispute arbitration clauses."'16 4 Should "a class of
investors emerge who object to predispute arbitration agreements," the
Commission is optimistic that competitive forces will result in some
firms offering margin or options accounts without such agreements. 65
The problem with the Commission's speculations is the status of
the typical small investor. It is widely accepted that this category of
investor is at the mercy of considerably more powerful economic and
psychological forces in negotiating the terms of a brokerage agree-
ment.16  Whether or not this belief is true, these allegations constantly
counts was particularly disturbing." Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 484 (statement
of David S. Ruder, SEC Chairman). The Commission apparently has no intent to take action itself
on this issue; it has determined to "look for guidance and information from the" SROs, but ex-
pects "strong assurances that customer choice, at least in cash accounts, will be maintained." Id. at
484-85.
161. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, at 80,113
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also Arbitration Reform Hearings,
supra note 6, at 271-72 (statement of James C. Meyer, Pres., N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n). James
Meyer observed:
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will be made, and the effect of failing to respond to them may be to
diminish public confidence in the capital markets and in industry spon-
sored arbitration.16 Additionally, even the practical effect of the cur-
rent pressure from leaders in the legislative and regulatory arenas to
reform the system may not suffice to maintain, on a permanent basis,
the judicious approaches to the use of mandatory provisions that appar-
ently now prevail. 16 8 Once reforms are in place, or with the introduction
of a different regulatory philosophy, "business as usual" would be free
to resume. 69
On the other hand, to the extent arbitration is established as a fo-
rum of unquestionable integrity and effectiveness, the notion of unfet-
tered choice of forum becomes more a rhetorical or political device than
a matter of substance. If arbitration is truly a fair, impartial, efficient
It has become increasingly clear that signing a predispute arbitration agreement is rap-
idly becoming a precondition for doing business. A customer who does not want to sign such a
contract is not likely to get an account. Given the manner in which arbitration agreements are
typically presented to investors, where there may be little or no disclosure, and the pressures
placed upon them to sign, it is simply not realistic to conclude that these arbitration agree-
ments are voluntary.
Id.
167. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 266 (statement of James C. Meyer,
Pres., N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n) (stating that "[a]rbitration reform would send a helpful signal to
investors who feel that no longer is there a place for the 'little guy' in the capital markets"); supra
notes 6 & 9.
168. The recent publicity and congressional attention directed at this matter apparently have
encouraged many brokerage firms to cease requiring mandatory clauses in cash account agree-
ments. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 484 (statement of David S. Ruder, SEC
Chairman); id. at 461 (statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey) (noting that because "the possibility
of legislation has become a reality, some firms which previously indicated an intention to incorpo-
rate arbitration clauses into cash accounts now disavow a 'present intent to do so' ").
169. For an example of the effect of regulatory philosophy on the extent of enforcement and,
thus, of investor protection, see Coll & Vise, Chairman Tried to Cool Staff Regulatory Zeal, Wash.
Post, Feb. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (discussing the regulatory approach of John Shad, former SEC
Chairman, and the purported effects of that approach). Specifically, the article noted:
Shad's actions reflected his desire to steer the SEC away from what he viewed as exces-
sive interference in the daily business of Wall Street, part of his broad interest in freeing
brokerage firms and the stock exchanges from what he felt was overregulation that restrained
the nation's economy.
The debate [between Shad and enforcement oriented staff at the SEC] had far-reaching
implications: It raised a basic question about who was responsible for detecting and prevent-
ing fraud on Wall Street. The issue took on added significance toward the end of Shad's
tenure at the SEC, when the biggest Wall Street corruption scandal in history erupted, focus-
ing in large part on charges of fraud by employees in a branch office of Drexel Burnham
Lambert Inc.
Id. at Al, col. 1, A17, col. 1. Contra Vise, Beyond Crisis Management, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1989,
HI, col. 2, in which it is reported that SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden takes a different ap-
proach: "His experience as the administration's quarterback of the savings and loan bailout legisla-
tion earlier this year reinforced his belief that free markets can function effectively only with
adequate government supervision and zealous enforcement." Id. at H4, col. 4 (emphasis added).
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device, nothing should be lost by allowing mandatory arbitration
clauses, especially in instances that limit unreasonable risk and expense
to brokerage firms.
b. Guiding Principles
In view of the foregoing considerations, three fundamental princi-
ples emerge. First, the present endeavors to place arbitration above re--
proach must continue, always seeking the highest level of quality.
Second, mandatory arbitration clauses must carry proper disclosure
that they are a condition precedent to effecting trades under the bro-
kerage agreement. Finally, such clauses must be allowed only to the ex-
tent they protect important interests of the brokerage firms and have a
negligible adverse impact on investor protection.
These principles would provide protection to investors against in-
advertently and unknowingly accepting such clauses to their detriment.
Also, by confining such clauses only to the most justifiable situations,
the industry would preserve and promote the crucial public perception
that it itself seeks to be fair. Finally, if arbitration is indeed fair and
effective, the problem simply should disappear.
c. Application of the Principles
(i) Who should be protected from mandatory arbitration clauses?
Because cash account agreements do not generate as high a risk for
firms as margin accounts, they may be clear candidates for a preclusion
against mandatory clauses. 17 0 This case, however, is the easy one; it is
the options and margin accounts that pose the difficult questions. 17 1 In
this regard, institutional and sophisticated investors are the most feasi-
ble category of candidates for not providing protections against
mandatory clauses in options and margin trading agreements. Con-
versely, smaller, less-informed investors would appear to deserve most
the benefit of a broader range of forum choices. The larger investor is
conceivably more capable of understanding the nature of the overall
agreement and probably occupies a stronger bargaining position; all of
which implies a greater ability to fend for one's self.17 2 Moreover, this
170. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 484 (statement of David S. Ruder,
SEC Chairman). Chairman Ruder, in expressing the industry's rationale for using mandatory
clauses, discusses only margin and options agreements, and even notes that "industry statements
have been made suggesting that many industry members will not [now] require predispute arbitra-
tion clauses in cash account agreements." Id.
171. Id.
172. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 271 (statement of James C. Meyer,
Pres., N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n). Mr. Meyer stated:
Interestingly, Mr. Ketchum [SEC Market Regulation Division Director, in the staff study
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type of trader is more likely to invest large sums, invoke sophisticated
trading schemes, or both, and generate larger risks for the brokerage
firm, the capital markets, and even the economy.173
Nevertheless, it could be argued that smaller investors, certainly
those of the speculative stripe, generally create greater degrees and
magnitudes of risk, especially in relation to their investments. They
have fewer resources from which to pay in the event of big losses and
are less sophisticated, impliedly making them more susceptible to mis-
takes in investment strategies. Therefore, the reasoning might proceed,
brokerage firms should have the right to limit their potential risks
through mandatory arbitration agreements. Mitigating this conclusion,
however, is the concept of suitability. When a broker applies proper
suitability standards, a smaller, less sophisticated investor only will be
allowed to trade or speculate within certain risk parameters.17 4
Thus the burden could be placed on the suitability evaluation. The
broker must conduct such an evaluation prior to entering each broker-
age agreement and should keep it in mind in advising customers, both
to serve the traditional function of limiting the nature of the invest-
of 65 top brokerage firms' practices with respect to mandatory arbitration clauses] noted that
brokerage firms are more flexible when it comes to some institutional investors, and are often
willing, when requested, to waive the predispute arbitration agreement for these institutional
investors. This raises troubling questions about the unfair advantage and access enjoyed by
large investors and denied to small investors.
Id. (emphasis in original).
173. R. HAMILTON, supra note 155, at 346.
Even though institutional investors view themselves as passive investors, their sheer size
raises unique market problems. For example, if an institutional investor decides to exercise its
Wall Street option and sell its shares, the block may be so large that only other institutional
investors have the capacity to absorb the shares. Large institutional holdings may therefore
increase the volatility of share prices since an independent decision by several large institu-
tional investors to dispose of their shares may markedly depress shortrun prices because there
is not enough demand to absorb the shares being dumped on the market.
Id.; see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 41 (1988) [herein-
after BRADY REPORT] (commenting on "several important themes" surrounding the October 1987
stock market crash). The Brady Report summarized: "Fourth, much of the selling pressure was
concentrated in the hands of surprisingly few institutions. A handful of large investors provided
the impetus for the sharpness of the decline." Id.
174. "Suitability" refers to the fitness of a particular investment security for the particular
investor to whom the investment is being recommended and the duty of the broker to seek a
reasonable match of the two-the "know your customer" rule. For example, the NASD RULES OF
FAIR PRACTICE art. III, § 2 provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member
shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such cus-
tomer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his security hold-
ings and as to his financial situation and needs.
Id.; see also NYSE Rule 405. In pursuit of establishing suitability, a broker's registered representa-
tive will elicit information on a prospective investor's investment history-length of time, types of
investments, etc.-salary and employment information, net worth, number of dependents, and
other pertinent matters.
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ment scheme to those types the investor can handle, and to limit some
of the firm's risks associated with margin and options trading. Under-
standably, broker-dealers would balk at this notion and reason that the
scope of permissible risk taking in carrying out an options or margin
trading arrangement is, and must be, broader than the scope of risk
taking within which a firm can operate without prescribing its own effi-
cient, economical dispute resolution mechanism. 175 Perhaps they would
be right, but the proposed arrangement certainly would create a closer
link between the firm's risks and its duty of vigilance in determining
which investors should be employing these more sophisticated and risky
investment vehicles and strategies. Also, neither the substance of inves-
tor protection nor the public perception of its status would suffer under
this proposed nexus; indeed, they would be enhanced.
Another argument in favor of mandatory arbitration clauses for
small investors. is that allowing small investors the option to go into
court invokes the complicated, already overcrowded machinery of the
judiciary-with all the attendant costs-in order to consider matters
too technical for a judge or jury to handle. 176 At the outset, however,
this concern would be reduced appreciably by the disincentives to small
investors to go into court that are based in the fundamental reasons for
arbitration: small investors are not likely to want to spend large sums
and wait for years for a court decision on what is usually a small
claim. 177 Therefore, fears of an avalanche of cases by small investors
probably are misplaced. Additionally, and particularly when frivolous
claims are asserted, dispositive motions and motions for fees and costs
are available to broker-dealers.' 78
175. Brokers probably would argue that the brokerage and investment relationships necessa-
rily entail providing investors with the latitude to take significant risks-and with the responsibil-
ity for losses flowing from accepting such risks-as long as those investors are fully informed, not
misled, and have been placed generally in the right speculative arena. Under those circumstances,
brokers might argue, firms and their registered representatives should not be required to serve as
guarantors of the success of an investment device or strategy.
176. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 76 (statement of Theodore A. Kreb-
sbach, Co-Head of Litigation Department, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.). Mr. Krebsbach argued
the McMahon case for Shearson before the Supreme Court. He states:
The delay resulting from the congestion in the federal courts is not the only problem
facing a potential litigant today. Even more significant is the cost of litigation, primarily re-
sulting from abuses of a discovery process which was originally designed to ensure due process
for all litigants.
.[I]n many cases a plaintiff's recovery is greatly reduced, and oftentimes it does not
equal the amount he has to pay his attorney in legal fees.
Id. at 76, 78.
177. Id.
178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (motion for sanctions based on frivolous allegations, claims, and
defenses); id. Rule 12(b) (motions to dismiss); id. Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the plead-
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Similarly, contentions that courts are ill-suited to handle the com-
plicated matters often presented in securities claims suffer from certain
countervailing realities. First, there is the entire body of complicated
business and financial matters that consistently find their way into the
court system. Courts always have been and always will be adjudicating
those matters and rendering opinions. Second, court rules such as Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 53 provide for the appointment of masters
in special instances such as these, in which the issues are complicated
and technical. 179 Thus, the use of the courts in disputes between bro-
ker-dealers and their customers does not necessarily place unreasonable
burdens on brokerage firms or lessen the possibility of a just resolution
of the conflict.
Finally, as this Article has alluded throughout, the basic notion of
choice is a hallowed concept in a democratic society, especially as it
relates to those with a disadvantage in terms of power or knowledge.
This theme always will exist and must be considered, both because it is
a legitimate value and because even its apparent abuse may have a fun-
damental, adverse effect on the integrity of the capital markets. 80 For
this reason, as well as the others discussed above, the proposed scheme
of prohibiting the use of mandatory predispute arbitration clauses
under certain circumstances would be beneficial and should be adopted.
ings); id. Rule 50(a) (motion for directed verdict); id. Rule 56 (motion for summary judgment); id.
Rule 54(d) (costs). It should be noted, however, that these provisions only may mitigate somewhat
the time and costs of litigation. See generally Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 76
(statement of Theodore A. Krebsbach) (citing Kaufman, The Public's Right to Speedier Justice,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1987, at A39, col. 2).
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 53 provides:
Rule 53. Masters.
(a) Appointment and Compensation. The court in which any action is pending may ap-
point a special master therein. As used in these rules the word "master" includes a referee, an
auditor, an examiner, and an assessor....
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions
to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in
actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation of
damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition
requires it.
Id. (emphasis added).
180. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 46 (statement of Rep. Edward J.
Markey). Representative Markey delivered a dramatic statement supporting the investor's right to
choose: "Events in recent times have crushed public confidence. An investment world dominated
by institutional trading, daylight trading and program trading is already a cold and uninviting
landscape for individual investors. Do we really want to take away their day in court as well?" Id.
1234 [Vol. 43:1199
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(ii) When arbitration is chosen or required, should nonindustry
forums be a required option?
Now that the enforceability of valid arbitration agreements is vir-
tually assured, and because these agreements are widely used, the logi-
cal question arises of whether arbitration before a nonindustry forum,
or at least the possibility of choosing that option, enhances the integrity
of securities arbitration. Many commentators believe such enhancement
occurs, primarily because the arbitration process is not administered by
the securities industry; thus neither the possibility of improper,
proindustry bias nor the perception of one, will be likely to exist.181
Because relatively few brokerage firms are willing to include the
AAA among the forum options in their arbitration agreements,182 many
customers have sought access through the "AMEX Window." Essen-
tially, this strategy is employed by customers in instances when their
brokerage firm is a member of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).
The idea is to claim a legal right to arbitrate before the purportedly
fairer AAA-notwithstanding the fact that the arbitration clause in the
brokerage agreement expressly lists only the AMEX and certain other
SRO forums as -choices-by relying on a construction of the AMEX
constitution.1 8
181. See Quinn, supra note 10, at 43. This article further states:
To resolve a dispute, choose the [American Arbitration Association]. In [the opinion of Rob-
ert Dyer, "a controversial and well-respected customer's attorney who prefers the AAA to the
SROs," SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 11] it's fairer to investors. For an
industry panel, take the National Association of Securities Dealers. Try to avoid the New
York Stock Exchange's panel, especially in New York where [Dyer] says, "investors get
hammered."
Id. (emphasis added); see also Dyer, A Practitioner's Critique, Or Looking At Arbitration From
The Customer's Viewpoint, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 335-36. Dyer further
states:
For all practical purposes, the American Arbitration Association is the only independent fo-
rum .
...In any given case, an SRO panel may render a fair decision, awarding all the relief
due under law. But all too often these SRO panels render compromise awards. On the other
hand, AAA panels, when they find in favor of the customer, are more likely to will [sfc] award
(1) damages based on the well-managed account measure of damages, now recognized by the
courts, (2) preaward interest, (3) attorney fees and (4) punitive damages where appropriate.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Poser, Securities Arbitration And The Expert, in 601 P.L.I., SE-
CURITIES ARBITRATION 1988 683, 691 (corporate law and practice course handbook series for 1988)
(stating that "the rules of the self-regulatory organizations should require that the arbitration
clauses used by their member firms give investors the option of selecting . . . [a]rbitration using
the facilities of the American Arbitration Association, in which the parties select mutually accept-
able arbitrators from lists provided by the A.A.A.").
182. See Dyer, supra note 181, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 335 (observ-
ing that "[t]here seems to be no evidence that as a result of these new securities rules any major
brokerage firms are giving their customers a choice of AAA").
183. See id. at 338-45; see also PaineWebber, Inc. v. Pitchford, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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A customer's argument first will observe that article VIII of the
AMEX constitution provides for AMEX members to "arbitrate all con-
troversies arising in connection with their business between or among
themselves or between them and their customers as required by any
customer's agreement or, in the absence of a written agreement, if the
customer chooses to arbitrate."184 Such arbitration will be conducted
under the Exchange's arbitration procedures, except "if any of the par-
ties to a controversy is a customer, the customer may elect to arbitrate
before the American Arbitration Association in the City of New York,
unless the customer has expressly agreed, in writing, to submit only to
the arbitration procedure of the Exchange."18"
Second, the customer will contend that this language, when consid-
ered along with the typical statements in brokerage agreements that
limit arbitration "in accordance with the rules, then obtaining," confers
a right upon the customer to arbitrate before the AAA. 8" More particu-
larly, the assertion is that the AMEX constitutional provision allowing
customers to "elect to arbitrate before the American Arbitration Associ-
ation in the City of New York" is a "rule," as contemplated in the bro-
kerage agreement.8 7 Several recent decisions, however, have effectively
closed the "AMEX window."
In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Pitchford8" the customers sought to liti-
gate a dispute with their broker before the AAA instead of before an
SRO sponsored panel, relying on the aforementioned legal argu-
ments. 89 Noting that the McMahon-Rodriguez line of cases has in-
creased the importance of this issue, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York resolved the matter against the
customers and the AMEX window theory. 90 The court relied on
Hybert v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc."" in finding that
"'[t]he "rules" referred to in the contract . . . refer to the arbitration
procedures of the three organizations, not to their constitutions or other
general provisions for resolving member disputes,'" and that "'[tihe
intent expressed in the language of the contract ... is to create a
Rep. (CCH) 1 94,717, at 93879 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1989); Hybert v. Shearson Lehman/American
Express Inc., No. 84 C 10327, slip op. (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1989).
184. AMEX Const. art. VIII, § 9062 (1) (1989).
185. Id. § 9063(2)(c).
186. See Pitchford, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 93,884; Friedman, Securities Case Law, Recent De-
velopments, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
187. Pitchford, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 93,884; Dyer, supra note 181, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION
1989, supra note 8, at 338-40; Friedman, supra note 186, at 3.
188. [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 94,717, at 93,879 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1989).
189. Id. at 93,880.
190. Id. at 93,884-86.
191. Hybert, No. 84 C 10327, slip op. at 1.
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choice of three arbitration forums.' "192
Accordingly, the court in Pitchford also concluded that the con-
tractual references to "rules" meant the arbitration procedures of the
three electable organizations, not their constitutions. 193 In holding that
the agreement limited the parties' selection of arbitration forums to the
three specifically named in the arbitration clause and excluded the
AAA, the court declined to create a fourth electable forum, a forum
that had neither adopted the Uniform Code of Arbitration, nor been
envisioned as an arbitral alternative by the parties themselves.194
As an alternative basis for compelling arbitration in one of the fo-
rums specified in the brokerage agreement, the court quoted from Crea-
tive Securities Corp. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 95 a Second Circuit case
which held that "private agreements of the parties, such as the cus-
tomer agreements here in issue, 'can validly modify the arbitration pro-
visions of [an SRO] as they apply to the parties to such
agreements.' "19 Thus, the arbitration agreement in that case "may be
said to override the AMEX constitution's provisions relating to arbitra-
tion before the AAA, such that the parties intended only to provide for
arbitration before an SRO."' 7
The Pitchford court also proceeded to make an assumption that
was not particularly well founded, but bears major-and unfortu-
nate-implications for the prospects in the courts, of customers who
believe that nonindustry arbitral forums are their only hope for truly
192. Pitchford, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 93,884-85 (quoting Hybert, slip op. at 10).
193. Id. at 93,885.
194. Id.
195. 671 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd mem., 847 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
196. Pitchford, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 93,885 (quoting Creative Securities, 671 F. Supp. at 966-
67).
197. Id. The court also explained that Litigation Release No. 12,198 [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,437, at 80,377 (Aug. 7, 1989), had no effect on its holding. That
Release, which prohibits arbitration agreements that limit customers to a single arbitration forum,
was adopted specifically to negate the holding in Roney & Co. v. Goren, 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir.
1989), which upheld the enforceability of such an agreement. Litigation Release No. 12,198, supra,
at 80,378; see also Friedman, supra note 186, at 7, col. 1.
The court also held that claimants who had not signed customer agreements, or whose cus-
tomer agreements did not contain arbitration agreements, were free to avail themselves of the
AMEX Window, when the brokerage firm involved was a member of the AMEX. Pitchford, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. at 93,886. The court added, however, that only the AAA forum in New York is availa-
ble in such circumstances, because "the provision of the AMEX constitution pursuant to which a
member of the AMEX agrees to allow customers to elect arbitration 'before the [AAA] in the City
of New York' is clear and unequivocal: 'in the City of New York' specifically states the venue of
such arbitration proceedings." Id. Thus, however inconvenient it may be for claimants, in those
instances when the AMEX Window is available to pursue AAA arbitration, that claimant must be
prepared to travel to New York City to conduct the hearing, because "[t]here is no other reasona-
ble way that this term could be construed without being superfluous." Id. The deterrent effect of
such a conclusion on the choice to invoke the AMEX Window is both harsh and evident.
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impartial and fair dispute resolution in a post-McMahon-Rodriguez era.
The court "assume[d]," in a footnote, that because "the SRO forums
are SEC approved and regulated... they are more experienced than
the AAA in dealing with the types of disputes in question."198
First, in all due respect to the SEC's legal mandate under the se-
curities laws and its extensive interaction with the SROs in formulating
these new rules, it is a non sequitur to state that simply because of this
approval and regulation the SRO forums are somehow more exper-
ienced than the AAA at securities arbitration. Second, quite apart from
the significant fact that an arbitration system only need be competent
and "sufficiently experienced," rather than "more experienced," the
real problem with the court's statement is that it no doubt will be inter-
preted by some as a definitive, although sub silentio, conclusion, in fact
and in law. With no apparent basis in empirical evidence, the court
strongly suggests that a major, national organization, founded in 1926
with the broad purposes of "foster[ing] the study of arbitration, . . .
perfect[ing] its techniques and procedures under arbitration law, and
... advanc[ing] generally the science of arbitration" 99 is not as compe-
tent as the SRO forums to arbitrate disputes between broker-dealers
and their customers. The SEC, it should be noted, appears to take a
quite different view. 200
Although it is doubtful that customers are in any real danger of
proindustry bias in SRO sponsored arbitration, customers should never-
theless have the option to choose a nonindustry forum. 01 Investor con-
198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, A GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS 31 (apparently
quoting from the purposes statement of the AAA organizational documents). It should be noted
that the AAA has reevaluated and amended its securities arbitration rules; they became effective
as of January 1, 1989. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES; see also Robbins,
supra note 15, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 32. Robbins states that "Of the
50,000 AAA arbitrators in 1989, approximately 1,400 are qualified to hear securities cases. Of that
number, 804 are affiliated with the securities industry, 89 are customer attorneys and 540 are
knowledgeable about securities but have no affiliation with the industry." Id. at 32 (citing Fried-
man, Securities: The Latest Developments, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1989, at 3, col. 1).
200. See Letter from SEC Market Regulation Division Director Richard G. Ketchum to all
members of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) (Sept. 10, 1987) (recom-
mending the adoption of numerous measures to enhance securities arbitration). The letter stated:
Increasing Pressure on SRO Arbitration Systems
SRO arbitration case load has increased dramatically in the past five years and is growing
rapidly. We recommend that SICA encourage broker-dealers to include in their arbitration
clauses the option of using AAA arbitration as well as SRO arbitration forums. A choice of
forums could reduce case load and the case turnaround time of SRO sponsored forums.
Id. Although the SEC's recommendation focused on the reduction of SRO arbitration case load
and turnaround time, the SEC obviously would not have made such a recommendation had it not
deemed the AAA a competent forum in which to conduct securities arbitration.
201. After serving as an arbitrator in numerous industry-sponsored arbitrations, the Author
does not view such proceedings as basically fraught with the dangers claimed to be present by the
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fidence in arbitration as a meaningful dispute resolution vehicle will be
enhanced, and, likewise, the industry's concerns about economy and ef-
ficiency also will be satisfied. The AAA in many instances draws from
the same persons used in industry arbitration, and thus the competence
of the panels should be comparable.10 Finally, greater cooperation and
coordination between the AAA and the securities industry arbitration
system only could improve both systems, with beneficial results for all
concerned.
B. Preparation for the Hearing
Without adequate prehearing preparation rules, investors are espe-
cially at risk because the brokerage firm probably will possess not only
most of the pertinent documents and other evidence, but also will have
advance knowledge of the applicable rules, guidelines, and practices.203
At the same time, an investor's complaint, particularly when the inves-
tor proceeds pro se, may be vague and incomplete, therefore leaving the
broker-dealer at a disadvantage in case preparation. 2 4 The solution to
these problems must strike the proper balance between flexibility and
specificity, in order to allow all parties access to relevant information
without rendering arbitration uncharacteristically burdensome and
legalistic.20 5
The new rules have improved substantially the opportunity for fair
and complete prehearing preparation. Like the old rules, the new ones
encourage the parties to "cooperate . . .in the voluntary exchange" of
information "to expedite arbitration. '206 Similarly, the new rules also
various critics of SRO arbitration. But see Dyer, supra note 181, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989,
supra note 8, at 335-36. Whatever is the reality of SRO arbitration integrity, rules that are decid-
edly protective of all participants' rights must be present. The reasons for strong SRO rules are
twofold. First, it is imperative that the rules serve both a preventive and a deterrent function, thus
warding off biased action to the detriment of investors; this function is necessary because such bias
is certainly a possibility. Second, it is equally important that the rules demonstrate to investors, in
form and in substance, the SROs' intention to operate fairly.
202. See supra note 199.
203. In the Author's own experience as an arbitrator, before the new rules, complaining cus-
tomers were hampered occasionally in their case presentations by a less than rigorous discovery
system in SRO sponsored arbitration. This observation means neither that the system could not be
made to work effectively nor that a rigid, bureaucratic maze should have been set in place. The
new rules will make the avenues of discovery much more definite and clear, while retaining the
flexibility necessary for arbitration to bring to bear its traditional advantages.
204. Not only are customers' complaints sometimes rather incomprehensible, but also, their
eventual presentations at hearings may or may not reflect the claims they appeared to make in
their initial papers.
205. See Katsoris, supra note 97, at 287 n.52.
206. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 619(a). The new Rule
provides:
(a) Requests for Documents and Information.
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provide for subpoena powers, directing of appearances, and the ex-
change of documents to be introduced at the hearing.0 7
The new rules introduce substantial improvements with respect to
the prehearing phase, notably through procedures providing for Pre-
hearing Conferences, °8 prehearing decisions by an arbitrator when nec-
essary,209 and means of handling "information requests"-including
depositions-as well as objections to such requests. 210 Therefore, these
current rules appear to provide a sufficient basis for achieving proper
prehearing preparation in the full range of cases that come to
arbitration.
C. Arbitrator Conflicts of Interest
The conflict of interest issue goes to the heart of the debate sur-
rounding arbitration and its fitness as the major avenue of recourse for
claims based on brokerage account activity. What justice can there be
The parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in the voluntary exchange of doc-
uments and information to expedite the arbitration. Any request for documents or other in-
formation should be specific, relate to the matter in controversy, and afford the party to
whom the request is made a reasonable period of time to respond without interfering with the
time set for the hearing.
Id.
207. See, e.g., id. Rule 619(f). NYSE Arbitration Rule 619(f) provides:
The arbitrator(s) and any counsel of record to the proceedings shall have the power of
the subpoena process as provided by law. All parties shall be given a copy of the subpoena
upon its issuance. The parties shall produce witnesses and present proofs to the fullest extent
possible without resort to the subpoena process.
Id. NYSE Arbitration Rule 619(g) allows the arbitrators to direct the appearance of any person
employed by or associated with any NYSE member firm, as well the production of records in the
possession or control of such persons or members, without the subpoena process. See, e.g., id.
Rules 619(a)-(c). These rules set forth a somewhat more extensive scheme for document produc-
tion and information exchange. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 619(d)(1). Rule 619(d)(1) al-
lows a party, an arbitrator, or the Director of Arbitration to request a prehearing conference to
achieve agreement regarding:
[A]ny issues that relate to the pre-hearing process or to the hearing, including but not limited
to, the exchange of information, exchange or production of documents, identification of wit-
nesses, identification and exchange of hearing documents, stipulation of facts, identification
and briefing of contested issues, and any other matters which will expedite the arbitration
proceedings.
Id. Additionally, issues not resolved at the hearing may be referred to an arbitrator. Id. Rule
619(d)(2).
209. See, e.g., id. Rule 619(e) (providing essentially that all unresolved issues related to the
discovery process, whether subpoenas, information requests or directing of appearances, may be
resolved by an arbitrator or, if necessary, by the full arbitration panel).
210. See, e.g., id. Rules 619(a)-(c) (setting forth requirements, including time schedules, for
making information requests, objecting to such requests, and for exchanging documents and iden-
tifying witnesses to be presented at the hearing). Only document exchange and witness identifica-
tion related to direct examination are required. The arbitrators may exclude any documents not
exchanged or witnesses not identified. Id.
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for a complaining (or defending) investor, so goes the argument, when
claims are heard in industry affiliated forums with panels of arbitrators
who have close ties to the industry?211 The argument has considerable
resonance, not only because of its implications as to just adjudication of
investor claims and defenses, but also because of its relevance to perva-
sive concerns about the integrity of the capital markets generally. It is
for these reasons that the SROs proposed, and the SEC approved, sub-
stantial provisions guaranteeing protection against conflicts of interest
by arbitrators, but at the same time encouraging the creation of arbitra-
tion panels containing persons experienced and knowledgeable in the
resolution of complex financial issues. Because the rules represent a
creditable "effort to address possible perceptions of bias, '2 12 they only
will be summarized briefly below, followed by several observations and
proposals.
Central to the rules is the definition of a "securities arbitrator," a
position whose holder is usually in the minority on the arbitration panel
but possesses invaluable expertise.2 13 The definition of an arbitrator
"from the securities industry" is as follows:
1. a person associated with a member, or broker/dealer, government securities bro-
ker, government securities dealer, municipal securities dealer or registered invest-
ment adviser, or
2. has been associated with any of the above within the past five (5) years, or
3. is retired from or spent a substantial part of his or her business career in any of
the above, or
4. is an attorney, accountant or other professional who devoted twenty (20) percent
or more of his or her professional work effort to securities industries clients within
the last two (2) years.214
The definition of a "public arbitrator" encompasses all remaining per-
sons who seek to be arbitrators, with an important exception for
spouses of securities arbitrators." 5
211. See Galberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1987, § 3, at 1,
col. 1. "'The [brokerage] houses basically like the current [arbitration] system because they own
the stacked deck.'" Id. at 8, col. 1 (quoting Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman of the ABA Task Force
on Securities Arbitration); see also Quinn, supra note 10.
212. Exchange Act Release No. 26,584 (Mar. 1, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 9955, 9957 (1989) (pro-
posing amendments to the NASD Rules of Fair Practice).
213. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULEs, supra note 146, Rule 607(a)(1) (providing that un-
less a public customer requests otherwise, the panel shall consist of a majority of nonindustry
arbitrators).
214. See id. Rule 607(a)(2). The NASD and AMEX rules differ in certain significant re-
spects. See NASD CODE ARBITRATION P. § 19(c)(1)-(4); AMEX R. 602(c)(1)(i)-(iv); infra notes 229-
38 and accompanying text.
215. NYSE ARBrrRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 607(a)(3); AMEX R. 602(c)(2); NASD
CODE ARBITRATION P. § 19(d) (excluding investment advisers, unlike the NYSE and AMEX rules).
The Rules specify that:
An arbitrator who is not from the securities industry shall be deemed a public arbitrator. A
person will not be classified as a public arbitrator if he or she has a spouse or other member of
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Because information about the arbitrators assigned to a case is im-
portant, the rules require that the parties be provided with the arbitra-
tors' names and employment histories for ten years, as well as any
specific information on conflicts of interest, and that the parties may
make further inquiry concerning any arbitrator's background.216 Addi-
tionally, each arbitrator sustains a "continuing duty" to ascertain and
disclose:
Any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitra-
tion; ... [and] [a]ny existing or past financial, business, professional, family or
social relationships that are likely to affect impartiality or might reasonably create
an appearance of partiality or bias... with any party or its counsel, or with any
witness. . . [whether through the arbitrator directly or through] members of
their families or their current employers, partners or business associates.21 7
The Director of Arbitration may remove an arbitrator based on
conflicts of interest;218 or a party may challenge any or all arbitrators
for cause, as well as make one peremptory challenge. 219 "In order to
insure continued investor confidence in the arbitration process," the
New York Stock Exchange submitted Guidelines for Classification of
Arbitrators along with its proposed rule amendments. 220 This policy
statement is mainly an interpretive guide, and its effect will be to
tighten further the conflict of interest restrictions of the actual rules.
The document reiterates the negative implications in the rules of a pro-
spective arbitrator having "close ties" with the industry, but goes fur-
ther in establishing a clear bias toward honoring challenges in such
instances.221 For example, spouses of industry personnel are precluded
from serving as arbitrators of any type. In general, "[a]ny close question
on arbitrator classification or on challenges for cause shall be decided in
favor of public customers. 2 2
These rules represent a commendable effort at achieving both the
form and substance of fairness in arbitration, but they do generate sev-
eral areas deserving comment. One such area is the perception some-
the household who is a person associated with a registered broker, dealer, municipal securities
dealer, government securities broker, government securities dealer or investment adviser.
NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 607(a)(3).
216. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rules 608, 610.
217. See, e.g., id. Rule 610(a).
218. See, e.g., id. Rule 610(d).
219. See, e.g., id. Rule 609 (previously in effect and not amended) (providing that "each
party shall have the right to one peremptory challenge ... [and] [t]here shall be unlimited chal-
lenges for cause").
220. NYSE GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
221. The Guidelines focus particularly on family relatives of broker-dealers and professionals
with close ties to, or past affiliations with, broker-dealers, providing that challenges for cause in
those cases shall be "honored" or "sustained." See id.
222. Id. As to spouses, the guidelines provide that "Spouses of securities industry personnel
may not serve as arbitrators." Id.
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times advanced that the administration of arbitration by industry
affiliated organizations presents the specter of bias.2"' A second impor-
tant issue is the NASD's rule that would allow investment advisers to
be public arbitrators.224 A third area for consideration is the failure of
the NASD and the AMEX to adopt the NYSE rules that extend from
three years to five years the period that a securities industry employee
who leaves the industry must wait before being qualified to serve as a
public arbitrator, and that prohibit a securities industry employee who
has worked for the industry for a substantial period of time and then
leaves the industry from ever serving as a public arbitrator. '25 A final
area deserving comment is the rule allowing an attorney, accountant, or
other professional who devotes less than twenty percent of his or her
professional work effort over the previous two years to securities indus-
try clients to serve as a public arbitrator.2
As to the first area, the present efforts at reform, as well as the
quality of future arbitrations, either will diminish or sustain any suspi-
cions about improper industry influence on SRO sponsored arbitration.
Additionally, rules could create or, if it already exists, clarify, the public
customer's right to choose arbitration before the American Arbitration
Association, which is not connected with the industry. Indeed, the SEC
has recommended, although for different reasons, that arbitration
clauses include the AAA as an option.227 Although the suspicions in this
regard may have little or no foundation,2 s the clearly expressed grant
223. See supra note 211.
224. NASD CODE ARBITRATION P. § 19(c)(1); see also NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
146, Rule 607(a)(2); AMEX R. 602(c)(1)(i).
225. NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 607(a)(2); see also NASD CODE ARBI-
TRATION P. § 19(c)(2), (3); AMEX R. 602(c)(1)(ii), (iii).
226. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 607(a)(2)[4].
227. Letter from Richard Ketchum of the SEC Market Regulation Division to all SICA
members (Sept. 10, 1987). The SEC Division Chief stated that because the
SRO arbitration case load has increased dramatically in the past five years and is growing
rapidly. . ., [w]e recommend that SICA encourage broker-dealers to include in their arbitra-
tion clauses the option of using AAA arbitration as well as SRO arbitration forums. A choice
of forums could reduce case load and the case turnaround time of SRO sponsored forums.
Id.
228. In the Author's experience, SRO arbitrations not only have been fair, but also have gone
to great lengths to render justice to the customer in both form and substance. On the specific issue
of bias by securities arbitrators in SRO sponsored hearings, see Robbins, supra note 15, in SECURI-
TIES ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 167. David Robbins observes:
It would surprise many practitioners to know that most determinations of liability are
unanimous and that it is usually the industry arbitrator leading the charge against the im-
proper conduct. .
Even the SEC has commented, "The review did not disclose any problems involving the
use of industry arbitrators in investor arbitration."
Id. (quoting Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, SEC Director of Market Regulations, to James E.
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of the aforementioned choice only could add to the integrity of arbitra-
tion generally and industry sponsored arbitration in particular.
The NASD chose to depart from the Securities Industry Confer-
ence on Arbitration proposals on conflicts of interest by deleting invest-
ment advisers from the list of persons automatically designated to be
securities arbitrators. The NASD reasons that "registered investment
advisers are generally well-informed and well-qualified individuals and
are, in fact, independent from the securities industry . . . . Further,
such individuals represent an untapped source whose enrollment would
serve to replenish the NASD's pool of public arbitrators," which would
be reduced significantly by rules that will expand substantially the
scope of persons automatically designated as securities arbitrators and
exclude spouses.22 9
As is true with the rules as a whole, the crucial question remains
whether this reasoning will be well received by the investing public. On
the subject of conflicts of interest, perception is an especially sensitive
issue. Those with only a generalized understanding of the investment
adviser's function might view that professional as just another securities
industry expert. Also, because of the complexity of the securities field
and the expanding and overlapping roles of different types of busi-
nesses, one can never know what conflicts potentially exist. Nonethe-
less, the strength of the overall scheme of conflict of interest rules bodes
well for acceptance of the NASD's position. In particular, the classifica-
tion, disclosure, and removal provisions of the rules2 30 provide a de-
pendable basis for determining and remedying the existence of
potential conflicts of interest for investment advisers seeking to serve as
public arbitrators.
What should be added to the NASD rules, however, are the policy
guidelines submitted to the Commission by the NYSE.23' These guide-
lines-including the policy statement favoring public customers' chal-
Buck, Senior Vice President & Secretary of NYSE (Sept. 10, 1987)). It should be noted, however,
that Mr. Meyer of the North American Securities Administrators Association appears to have an
answer for just such observations. See Arbitration Reform Hearings, supra note 6, at 283 (state-
ment of James C. Meyer). Mr. Meyer stated that "[s]ecurities industry professionals contend that
arbitrators are unbiased and oftentimes harsher on their colleagues than others might be in arbi-
tration proceedings. That may or may not be true. But even if it is, the perception of fairness is as
important as the reality of fairness." Id.; see also supra notes 181, 201-02 and accompanying text.
229. Exchange Act Release No. 26,584, supra note 212, at 9957 (proposing amendments to
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice); see also Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, at
80,103 n.19 (approving the NASD proposal, notwithstanding its variation from those of the NYSE
and the AMEX). The Release states: "It is not inconsistent with the [Securities Exchange] Act to
permit this divergence in approach among the SROs." Id.
230. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rules 607-611.
231. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text; see also Exchange Act Release No.
26,805, supra note 21, at 80,102 n.13.
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lenges-would enhance substantially the NASD's attempt to strike a
fair and equitable balance between the need to add numerous compe-
tent persons to the pool of public arbitrators without any compromise
in the integrity of the arbitration system. As it now stands, the NASD
rule is certainly sufficient, but it undoubtedly should be a special focus
of the monitoring and evaluation that the SEC and the SROs already
intend to perform on an ongoing basis.232
The difference between the NYSE's five year waiting period before
a securities industry employee can serve as a public arbitrator and the
NASD's and the AMEX's three year period is probably not crucial. 33
The SEC, in approving the two periods, viewed them "both [as being]
consistent with the [Securities Exchange] Act. '234 It is fortunate for the
NASD that the SEC holds this opinion, because the rationale offered
for not extending the three year period, namely that the pool of public
arbitrators in the era of the new rules will be sizably diminished and
impermissibly small, may not be very strong, and the measure will need
SEC support.23 5
The NASD and the AMEX should adopt the NYSE's rule prohibit-
ing a securities industry employee who has worked in the industry for a
substantial period of time from becoming a public arbitrator. 3 6 The
rule is a sound one. It recognizes the simple yet strong possibility of
deep-seated bias, conscious or unconscious, on the part of an individual
who has worked in an industry. As such, the rule precludes the eventu-
ality that a majority of an arbitration panel, in any given case, could
consist of persons oriented toward the securities industry. ' At a mini-
232. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, at 80,114 n.59. The Release provides
that:
Open and continuous dialogue with the SROs on all matters, including the need to consider
regulatory changes, is essential to the working of the scheme of self-regulation established by
Congress. This process has included significant public dialogue, and all commenters' views
...have been considered in the context of. . . rule filings pursuant to Rule 19b-4.
Id.; see also Karmel, supra note 153.
233. Compare NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 607(a)(2)[2] with NASD
CODE ARBITRATION P. § 19(c)(2) and AMEX R. 602(c)(1)(ii).
234. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, at 80,103.
235. This opinion is based on the Author's personal experience and knowledge, based on
discussions with arbitrators who rarely are called to hear cases. Perhaps scheduling conflicts, the
sheer administrative burden of contacting the arbitrators, and conflicts of interest account for
some of the absence of opportunities. As to the conflict of interest problem, however, many of
these persons are from academia, thus virtually always eliminating the problem, or are securities
lawyers who do not represent brokerage firms. In any event, many never are contacted in the first
instance.
236. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, 80,102.
237. Because the average panel consists of three persons, with one of them formally required
to be from the securities industry, a second panel member with very strong ties to the industry
could, in effect, produce a panel with a majority of securities arbitrators.
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mum, guidelines with a bias in favor of customer challenges for cause
should be adopted, and in any event, this area should be carefully eval-
uated in the future by the SEC and the SROs.23 s
The provision in the rules allowing an attorney, accountant, or
other professional to become a public arbitrator who devotes less than
twenty percent of his or her professional work effort to securities indus-
try clients elicited one important concern during the comment period of
the proposed rules: that percentage work effort, although less than
twenty percent, could constitute a professional's "'single greatest and
most consistent source of income.' "29 Moreover, the rule does not ap-
pear to account for the scenario in which a professional, or his or her
firm, is engaged in a determined effort to increase significantly its per-
centage of securities industry clients.240
A balanced solution to this potential problem lies in combining dis-
closure in such instances with a strong presumption in favor of a cus-
tomer's challenge for cause. The NYSE guidelines exemplify such a
presumption. Through this combination, a customer could analyze the
information that is now required to be disclosed, in order to determine
whether the possibility of bias exists on the part of a prospective arbi-
trator, and feel secure that his or her reasonable expressions of concern
truly will be respected. On the other hand, to the extent disclosure does
not reveal a proper basis for exclusion, the arbitration process will have
been enhanced by virtue of the addition of an arbitrator with actual
knowledge of, and experience in, the securities industry.
D. Arbitrator Awards
Certain features of the arbitration process prior to the new rules
elicited basic and instinctual suspicions about arbitration. The awards,
which could be substantial in amount, were final and binding." The
238. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 607(a)(2)[]; supra note 225.
239. Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, at 80,102 (quoting Comment of Public
Citizen, a public interest organization).
240. The prime example would be a firm, small or large, that has decided upon representa-
tion of securities firms as an important new growth area, deserving of increased re-
sources-including development and marketing efforts-but that at present obtains only 19% of
its income from such firms. Obviously, under such a scenario, this firm's new emphasis and future
vision of its business indicate that certainly its partners who formulate and implement policy will
have a potential conflict of interest when they are designated to serve as public arbitrators. Addi-
tionally, considering the realities of firm dynamics, a young associate who wants to advance might
be even more vulnerable to biased decision making, and thus that person also could have a signifi-
cant conflict of interest.
241. NASD CODE ARBITRATION P. § 41(a),(b), provide:
(a) All awards shall be in writing and signed by a majority of the arbitrators or in such man-
ner as is required by applicable law. Such awards may be entered as a judgment in any court
of competent jurisdiction.
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arbitrators were not required to write opinions stating their findings of
fact and conclusions of law.242 No record of the proceedings was re-
quired to be kept.2 43 Moreover, the award was not made public. 44 Such
characteristics prompted Justice Harry Blackmun to dissent from the
majority's conclusion in McMahon that the quality and effectiveness of
arbitration has improved vastly since the Wilko decision. Blackmun
noted that records of arbitration proceedings were not required, that
arbitrators were not bound by precedent, and that judicial review re-
mained substantially limited to those grounds set forth in the Arbitra-
tion Act as well as a vague "manifest disregard" of law standard. 2 4
The new rules are partially responsive to these criticisms. For ex-
ample, one rule requires that "[a] verbatim record by stenographic re-
porter or tape recording of all arbitration hearings shall be kept. " 246
The purpose of this rule is to "provide a sufficient record for review. "247
Additionally, certain other rules mandate that the award contain spe-
cific information central to the decision and that information contained
(b) Unless the applicable law directs otherwise, all awards rendered pursuant to this Code
shall be deemed final and not subject to review or appeal.
Id.; see also Robbins, supra note 15, in SECURITIEs ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 166.
What most distinguishes arbitration from litigation is that there is no right to appeal an
arbitration Award. The statutory and judicially created grounds for vacating or modifying an
Award are limited and, until recently, the Award gave no idea of the issues decided. Because
of the new SRO Award rule, more focus will be placed on the arbitrator's deliberative process.
Id.
242. The new rules set forth no specific requirements in this area. The common practice is
for arbitrators rarely to write opinions, and usually only in complex, special cases. See, e.g., NASD
CODE ARBITRATION P. § 41(a), (b).
243. See NASD CODE ARBITRATION P. § 37 (repealed) (stating that "[u]nless requested by the
arbitrators or a party or parties to a dispute, no record of an arbitration proceeding is required to
be kept").
244. See id. § 41(c) (repealed) (providing only for service of the award upon the parties or
their counsel, and not mentioning any form of public availability of the award).
245. 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Specifically, Blackmun stated:
Even those who favor the arbitration of securities claims do not contend, however, that
arbitration has changed so significantly as to eliminate the essential characteristics noted by
the Wilko Court. Indeed, proponents of arbitration would not see these characteristics as
"problems," because, in their view, the characteristics permit the unique "streamlined" na-
ture of the arbitral process. As at the time of Wilko, preparation of a record of arbitration
proceedings is not invariably required today. Moreover, arbitrators are not bound by prece-
dent and are actually discouraged by their associations from giving reasons for a decision.
Judicial review is still substantially limited to the four grounds listed in § 10 of the Arbitra-
tion Act and to the concept of "manifest disregard" of the law.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
246. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 623; see also AMEX R. 614
(the word "all" was omitted in the AMEX rule).
247. See Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis
for, the Proposed Rule Changes, Proposed Rule Changes by New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Pur-
suant to Rule 19b-4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 5. (File No. SR-NYSE-88-29)
[hereinafter NYSE Rule 19b-4 proposal].
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in the award be made public.2 48 These rules have the purpose of "as-
sur[ing] the parties that the arbitrators have considered all the issues
raised and damage claims made . . . [and therefore that] the parties
will have a better understanding of the decision ... [thus creating an]
increase [in] investor confidence in the arbitration process. 249
Laudable though these rules may be, certain key issues going to the
heart of the debate surrounding arbitration still must be addressed.
The focus of these issues is the reluctance of arbitrators and arbitration
rules to require that written opinions accompany awards. This practice
raises questions relative to how some basic objectives common to any
system of laws are to be met. Such objectives include providing guid-
ance in areas of potential conflict, such as broker-customer relations, as
to what standards of conduct should be observed. Another goal is to
provide a known and coherent body of jurisprudence in this area for
everyone's benefit, including legal counsel seeking to analyze and pre-
pare cases, and arbitrators seeking to render fair and consistent awards
in difficult cases. 250 A further objective is to provide a basis for judicial
challenges in proper instances.26 '
In addition to the specter of greater administrative expense and
time, arbitrators may prefer not to produce written opinions because
they realize the arbitration decisional process does not involve strict,
consistent application of pertinent legal principles. In fact, arbitrators
are most likely not to perform in-depth legal research. Their bases for
awards generally rest on what is "fair," "just," or "sensible" under the
circumstances.252
248. See, e.g., NYSE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 146, Rule 627(e),(f). The Rule specifi-
cally states:
(e) The award shall contain the names of the parties, a summary of the issues in controversy,
the damages and/or other relief requested, the damages and/or other relief awarded, a state-
ment of any other issues resolved, the names of the arbitrators, the date the claim was filed
and the award rendered, the location of the hearing, and the signatures of the arbitrators
concurring in the award.
(f) The awards shall be made publicly available, provided however, that the name of the
customer party to the arbitration will not be publicly available if he or she so requests in
writing.
Id.
249. NYSE Rule 19b-4 proposal, supra note 247, at 5.
250. See Exchange Act Release No. 26,805, supra note 21, at 80,109-11 (discussing the argu-
ments in favor of and against written opinions and deciding that a requirement that such opinions
accompany all awards is unnecessary at the present time).
251. Id. at 80,109.
252. The Author's experience in numerous hearings has shown that this practice is common.
It should be noted, however, that there is generally at least one arbitrator who is quite conversant
with the applicable legal principles. See Dyer, supra note 181, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989,
supra note 8, at 346. Dyer states: "If the arbitration panel is fair (and educated), they are just as
likely to 'follow the law' as any court." Id.
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Perhaps ironically, and certainly in most of the smaller cases, this
approach to decision making probably works to the benefit of the com-
plaining investor. For example, an investor suing in court on claims of
churning and unsuitability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder not only must plead the facts
with "particularity" under relevant procedural rules,2 5s but also must
plead and prove complex elements of the cause of action, such as scien-
ter, materiality, causation, and reliance.2 5 Indeed, the arbitrators' stan-
dards reflect, in a common sense way, basic rationales of the more
technical legal theories of customers' typical claims. Further, they are
probably more responsive to the customer's actual concern over broker
conduct at issue. Arbitrators' standards in general relax the legal theo-
ries in a manner that works to the customer's benefit. To the extent the
customer prevails, the brokerage firm would have considerable difficulty
meeting legal tests for setting aside an award. Under the Arbitration
Act, only fraud, evident partiality, or misconduct by arbitrators, or fail-
ure to render an award will suffice for a legal challenge.155 Additionally,
when arbitrators have acted in "manifest disregard" of the law, an
award can be overturned.256
Brokers' claims, on the other hand, usually are based in breach of
contract. These claims, much like less legally technical customer claims,
such as breach of fiduciary duty, are generally highly fact sensitive and
require some understanding of brokerage and capital market concepts,
operations, and standards. 257 Arbitration, with its relaxed procedural
rules and substantive standards-and under circumstances in which
bias, or the perception of it, are eliminated by virtue of procedures that
assure the entire system's integrity-would appear to serve the interests
of justice and economy quite well in most of these small cases.
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (providing, in pertinent part, that "[iln all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity").
254. For an extended discussion of the extensive proof requirements for establishing a cause
of action under Rule 10b-5 and other provisions, see Hood, Arbitration and Litigation of Public
Customers' Claims Against Broker-Dealers after McMahon, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541 (1988); Rob-
bins, supra note 15, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 66-73.
255. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), (b), (d) (1988); see also French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1986). Considerable deference is shown in the cases to
the arbitrators' determination. Id.
256. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 258 (1987); Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). For a thorough discussion of the grounds for vacating or modi-
fying an award, see Robbins, supra note 15, in SECURITIzS ARBITRATION 1989, supra note 8, at 183-
90.
257. Clearly, in these cases the arbitrators are concerned with determining all the facts, as
well as discerning specific industry practices, often through expert testimony, and rendering a deci-
sion based on equitable principles. The legal concepts, however, usually are known to at least one
arbitrator on the panel, and in any event, the underlying legal theories are relatively simple.
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It is the complicated cases, however, that should not be left to the
highly generalized adjudicatory process of arbitration as it is usually
conducted. These cases, often quite large and usually very complex
both legally and factually, upset the balance of interests that serves so
well in the simpler cases and pose greater possibilities of inadequate or
unjust awards.258 In such cases, the parties should be allowed access to
the courts. While present rules, however, allow the arbitrators "either
upon their own initiative or at the request of a party [to] dismiss the
proceeding and refer the parties to the remedies provided by applicable
law," no guidelines exist to aid the arbitrators in making such a
decision.25 9
Although guidelines should remain flexible to provide for varying
types of matters that can be deemed appropriate for referral, certain
areas should receive prime consideration. Class actions, cases challeng-
ing the legitimacy of industry practices, and matters that will involve
extensive discovery all would appear to qualify, if not for a presump-
tion, for a hard look by the arbitrators regarding whether judicial delib-
eration might be the best deliberative vehicle.8 0
IV. CONCLUSION
More than ever before, securities arbitration must meet its tradi-
tional challenge of balancing flexibility, economy, and convenience with
clarity, reason, and justice. The confluence of various legal and eco-
258. In the large, complicated cases, the parties proceed as though they were in court any-
way, with numerous briefs, motions, expert and lay witnesses, and extensive time requirements.
Additionally, and understandably, their expectations regarding rulings on motions and the like are
much more demanding. Certainly, many of these cases are susceptible to treatment by a well-
selected arbitration panel. At a minimum, however, a conscious, formal decision should be made as
to whether the matter should continue in arbitration.
259. NASD CODE ARBITRATION P. § 16.
260. The rules and procedures should be amended to provide guidelines with these examples
and to require the arbitrators to consider formally whether the case is appropriate for referral. See
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, United States Senate, Concerning Issues Related to Small Investors (Feb. 8, 1990) (testi-
mony of the Securities and Exchange Commission given by Richard G. Ketchum, Director, Divi-
sion of Market Regulation, and Joseph I. Goldstein, Associate Director, Division of Enforcement).
Director Ketchum noted in his testimony that "SICA and the SROs have not yet identified specific
areas where alternative rules for large and complex cases would be appropriate. As more complex
disputes come to arbitration, the need for appropriate procedures will heighten. The [Securities
and Exchange] Commission staff has encouraged SICA to renew its efforts to develop flexible alter-
native rules for complex cases." Id. at 33.
Notably a first edition of an arbitrators' manual has been distributed to arbitrators, and it
addresses, among other matters, the referral of cases to the courts. "The manual suggests that it
may be appropriate to refer parties to the courts in cases where all necessary parties have not
agreed to arbitration, class actions and derivative actions, cases that involve substantial legal issues
for which the establishment of legal precedent is important, and cases in which witnesses or docu-
ments essential to a fair and final decision are unavailable in the arbitral forum. Id. at 32 n.44.
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nomic events is directing increasingly large numbers of cases to this fo-
rum. The pervasive, adverse impacts of ineffective regulation of the
securities markets on investors, the capital markets, and the economy
are becoming clear.26' As such, there can be no place for the traditional
criticisms of arbitration to be, or even appear to be, true.
The challenge to arbitration is particularly serious because of the
securities industry's affiliation with the major arbitration programs.
The industry has made commendable progress, however, in reversing
some of the form and substance creating the basis of past suspicions
and doubts. This Article's discussions and recommendations are in-
tended to be a modest contribution to that progress. Inclusion of the
ideas expressed here into the body of applicable rules, along with con-
stant monitoring by the SEC, the industry, and the public, will surely
make the entire securities arbitration system worthy of the great re-
sponsibilities that now have devolved upon it.
261. See generally BRADY REPORT, supra note 173; SEC Div. OF MT. REGULATION, THE OCTO-
BER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988); INTERM REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
(1988).
1990] 1251

